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INTRODUCTION 
Meet Esther and Louis. Esther is 25 years old. She is a recent 
college graduate and works for a local non-profit organization 
that operates farmers’ markets and supports sustainable farming 
activities in southeastern Louisiana. Louis is 25 years old. He is a 
sous-chef at a popular New Orleans restaurant. When Esther and 
Louis met a year ago, their interests in local cuisine, the 
indigenous culture of New Orleans, and outdoor recreation drew 
them together quickly. They cooked dinners for each other. They 
rode their bicycles across the city. They talked for hours into the 
night. After three months, Esther and Louis moved into half of a 
double shotgun house in the Bywater, a thriving Bohemian village 
downriver from the French Quarter. Three months later, Louis and 
Esther decided to marry. 
 
In part, this is Esther and Louis’s story. But it is also the story 
of how the law of the mixed jurisdiction in which they live—
Louisiana—governs their life plans and projects. By examining 
moments when Esther and Louis are confronted with a particularly 
significant legal choice and are therefore most likely to seek the 
advice of lawyers, this Article seeks to shed some new light on an 
old jurisprudential debate.  
That jurisprudential debate is grounded in the recognition that 
the legal directives that govern our lives function in different ways 
depending on how those directives are designed.1 Some legal 
                                                                                                             
 1. In this Article, I draw principally on the following articulations and 
critiques of the rules versus standards debate: FREDERICK SCHAUER, THINKING 
LIKE A LAWYER: A NEW INTRODUCTION TO LEGAL REASONING 188–202 (2009); 
Kathleen Sullivan, The Supreme Court, 1991 Term—Foreword: The Justices of 
Rules and Standards, 106 HARV. L. REV. 22 (1992); Carol M. Rose, Crystals 
and Mud in Property Law, 40 STAN. L. REV. 577 (1988); Frederick Schauer, The 
Jurisprudence of Reasons, 85 MICH. L. REV. 847 (1987); P.S. Atiyah, From 
Principles to Pragmatism: Changes in the Function of the Judicial Process and 
2012] LOVE, LOYALTY AND THE LOUISIANA CIVIL CODE 925 
 
 
 
directives—“laws” in more common parlance—take the form of 
“rules.” A classic rule tells a decision maker to focus her decision-
making energy on a narrow set of facts; then, once a factual 
conclusion has been drawn, the rule supplies a more or less 
mechanical calculus yielding a particular result. Predictability, 
certainty, and efficiency are supposed to be the hallmarks of rules. 
When individuals like Esther and Louis encounter such a rule, their 
legal advisors should, in theory, be able to assure them with 
reasonable confidence of the likely consequences of their choices 
or actions.  
Other legal directives take the form of “standards.” A classic 
standard gives a decision maker more discretion. It allows the 
decision maker to examine all of the relevant facts and 
circumstances in a given situation in light of a general policy goal 
and then it directs the decision maker to fashion a remedy that does 
substantive justice to the parties involved. When individuals like 
Esther and Louis confront a classic legal standard, according to the 
typical jurisprudential account, their legal advisors must confess 
that the ultimate outcome of a dispute may be uncertain and that 
their fate may depend to a considerable extent on the subjective 
assessment of a particular judge or handful of judges. 
The current version of the Louisiana Civil Code contains more 
than 3,000 articles.2 Many of those articles provide classic, 
mechanistic rules that control or reward individual behavior ex 
ante and cabin judicial discretion. Others announce open-textured 
standards—that is, general policies that a judge must attempt to 
realize ex post by fashioning a remedy that achieves as much 
substantive justice as possible given the particular facts and 
circumstances of any case.  
A good number of the Civil Code’s provisions also provide 
opportunities for what I call “hybrid discretion.” On the spectrum 
between classic rules and classic standards, these articles lie 
somewhere in between. Sometimes they combine both rule-like 
principles and standard-like norms in the same text. Sometimes 
they consist of relatively flexible rules or more precisely tailored 
                                                                                                             
 
the Law, 65 IOWA L. REV. 1249 (1980); Duncan Kennedy, Form and Substance 
in Private Law Adjudication, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1685 (1976). 
 2. In the 2011 version of the Louisiana Civil Code, there are 3556 
numbered articles, but because a sizeable number of articles are in fact “blank,” 
“reserved,” or “repealed,” the actual quantity of functioning articles is somewhat 
smaller. For a discussion of why the revised Louisiana Civil Code contains these 
anomalous gaps, see VERNON V. PALMER, THE LOUISIANA CIVILIAN 
EXPERIENCE: CRITIQUES OF CODIFICATION IN A MIXED JURISDICTION 98 (2005). 
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standards.3 Frequently, a series of closely related articles function 
together, in conjunction with a series of jurisprudentially derived 
rules or statutory sources originating outside the Civil Code, to 
create complex mixtures of rule-like norms and standard based 
discretion. 
Over the years, numerous scholars working outside of 
Louisiana have attempted to assess the relationship between rules 
and standards in broad areas of both private law and constitutional 
law.4 Years ago, I addressed the desirability of rule-based and 
standard-based models of Civil Code decision making, and the 
virtues of certainty and flexibility, in one corner of property law 
and in the context of early debates over the nature of our Civil 
Code.5 This Article’s attempt to apply the rules versus standards 
paradigm to Louisiana law, however, is principally inspired by the 
eminent Scottish jurist, Niall Whitty.6 Writing in the Edinburgh 
Law Review a decade ago, at a time when the international 
comparative law community was beginning to examine mixed 
jurisdictions more carefully, Whitty examined the rules versus 
standards debate in the context of Scotland’s uncodified mixed 
legal system. He found that Scotland had at once accommodated 
and resisted pressure to replace hard-edged, crystalline rules 
affording the benefits of certainty and predictability with 
discretionary standards offering judges the flexibility to craft 
particularized remedies and provide substantive justice in 
individual cases.7  
Professor Whitty’s overall assessment of the development in 
his native jurisdiction was paradoxically both elegiac and 
optimistic. On one hand, he observed that in many areas of 
                                                                                                             
 3. See SCHAUER, THINKING LIKE A LAWYER, supra note 1, at 189–90 
(reflecting on the continuum between rules and standards); Sullivan, supra note 
1, at 61–62 (same). 
 4. See generally Atiyah, supra note 1 (addressing contract law); Sullivan, 
supra note 1 (constitutional adjudication); Rose, supra note 1 (property law).  
 5. See John A. Lovett, Another Great Debate?: The Ambiguous 
Relationship Between the Revised Civil Code and Pre-Revision Jurisprudence 
as Seen Through the Prytania Park Controversy, 48 LOY. L. REV. 615 (2002); 
John A. Lovett, On the Principle of Legal Certainty in the Louisiana Civil Law 
Tradition: From the Manifesto to the Great Repealing Act and Beyond, 63 LA. 
L. REV. 1397 (2003). 
 6. Whitty is a Visiting Professor at the University of Edinburgh and for 
many years was a Law Commissioner of the Scottish Law Reform Commission.  
 7. Niall R. Whitty, From Rules to Discretion: Changes in the Fabric of 
Scots Private Law, 7 EDIN. L. REV. 281 (2003). Whitty’s article was first 
presented as a paper at the First International Congress of the World Society of 
Mixed Jurisdiction Jurists in November 2002, at Tulane Law School in New 
Orleans, Louisiana. 
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Scottish private law there had occurred “a momentous change from 
rule-based judicial decision making to a discretionary 
jurisprudence of justifications,” a change that he believed was 
“irreversible in many respects,” given the moral attractiveness of 
allowing judges to work their way to the “right answer in the 
instant case,” and given that allowing judges this freedom often 
enables legislatures to avoid making difficult policy choices among 
competing interests.8 On the other hand, Professor Whitty also 
discerned within certain branches of Scottish law—in areas such as 
protection of family interests upon death, property, trusts, and debt 
collection—resistance to the Anglo-American trend toward 
“discretionary remedialism.”9 This “discretion-scepticism” might 
be aligned, Whitty suggested optimistically, with the traditional, 
arguably more civilian vein in Scots law of “allocating rights to 
people rather than powers to courts, of subordinating the judicial 
remedy to the substantive law right” and thus might preserve 
Scottish private law as a “system of rules” and “its virtues of 
certainty and predictability.”10 
When I began my own assessment of Louisiana law through 
the jurisprudential prism that Whitty had constructed so expertly, I 
expected, based on observations gleaned while teaching Louisiana 
property law and Louisiana sales and lease law, to find that 
Louisiana private law had generally undergone a similar shift to 
discretionary decision making within the realm of the Civil Code, 
punctuated perhaps with occasional moments of discretion 
skepticism. What I discovered, however, after focusing most 
intensively on some of the same substantive areas that Whitty had 
examined and that would most likely be encountered by our 
fictitious friends Esther and Louis, was that Louisiana had not 
evolved so decisively in the direction of standard-based decision-
making models. Indeed, in the areas of private law examined in 
this Article (family law, co-ownership, and the relationship 
between forced heirship and undue influence claims), I found that 
Louisiana’s private legal order has been only partially transformed 
by the trend toward discretionary remedialism that scholars like 
Whitty have observed occurring in many other legal regimes.  
Although some important parts of the Louisiana Civil Code 
have undeniably embraced open-textured standards (and, of 
course, some parts of the Civil Code have always depended 
                                                                                                             
 8. Id. at 339. 
 9. Id. at 328–37. 
 10. Id. at 339. 
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heavily on them),11 I found that judicial and legislative innovation 
both inside and outside of the Code has also tended to limit the 
discretion initially promised by those standards. In addition, I 
found that, in the areas under examination, Louisiana law 
increasingly relies on packages of legal directives that combine 
civil code articles taking the form of either rule-like or standard-
like norms with jurisprudential and non-codal statutory sources 
which modify those civil code directives to create decision making 
institutions that provide for complex forms of hybrid discretion. 
What accounts for this double-edged movement limiting 
classic standards and institutionalizing hybrid discretion? One 
explanation may be that lawmakers who desire to make some 
fundamental change in the law (for instance to incorporate broad 
new principles like no fault divorce and joint custody as norms in 
family law or to dramatically cabin forced heirship while opening 
the door to undue influence claims in the arena of intergenerational 
wealth transfers) are cognizant that these innovations will simply 
create too many diverse fact patterns to make highly detailed, 
precise rulemaking feasible at the outset. Consequently, these 
lawmakers tend to defer legislating specific rule-based outcomes 
and allow courts to continue their traditional job of gradually 
articulating more precise and transparent rules through 
jurisprudential development. In the end, legislatures can choose 
whether to codify or modify these jurisprudential rules or simply 
allow them to dominate the decision-making landscape, a kind of 
de facto codification by silent acceptance.12  
Another important explanation for why Louisiana has moved 
more quickly to cabin its more recent legislatively-enacted 
standards than a jurisdiction like Scotland is simply that Louisiana 
is more litigious. The widespread availability of lawyers in 
Louisiana, the relatively low costs of litigation in many parts of the 
state, the absence of the winner-takes-all English rule regarding 
attorney fees, and the widespread use of contingency fee 
arrangements all contribute to make Louisiana a place that 
produces far more reported judicial decisions than a jurisdiction 
like Scotland, even though Scotland’s population is approximately 
600,000 larger.13 As a result, the Louisiana legal system, whether 
                                                                                                             
 11. See, e.g., LA. CIV. CODE arts. 667–669 (2011) (obligations of vicinage), 
LA. CIV. CODE art. 2315 (2011) (delictual responsibility). 
 12. I am grateful to Kenneth Reid for suggesting this possible explanation. 
 13. To appreciate the disproportionate litigiousness of Louisiana as 
compared to Scotland, note that in 2010 alone, volumes 33 through 56 of the 
Southern Reporter (3d ed.) were devoted to Louisiana state court decisions, 
which account for 14 large books of the Louisiana edition of the Southern 
Reporter, each of which contains an average of 1000 to 1300 pages of appellate 
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the legislature intended it or not, is often able to generate, in 
relatively quick order, detailed judicial interpretation and 
refinement of the open-textured standards embedded in our Civil 
Code. Of course, this means that any litigants (and their lawyers) 
who confront broad standards just after their enactment bear 
considerably higher litigation and uncertainty costs than do 
litigants who confront the same standards 20 or 30 years later, after 
the courts (and the legislature) have chiseled them down into more 
crystalline rules. 
One more explanation for the movement toward complex 
blends of hybrid discretion can be found in the placement of 
Louisiana’s mixed legal system within a complex federal system. 
As we will see with regard to child support disputes, Louisiana’s 
initial gesture toward broad discretion was significantly 
constrained by the impact of federal legislation that required 
Louisiana to adopt a much more detailed set of rules to guide 
judges in making child support awards. 
The plan of this Article is straightforward. In the Preliminary 
Title portion, I provide a brief introduction to the vocabulary, 
descriptions and justifications typically displayed in jurisprudential 
debates over rules versus standards. In Books One, Two and Three 
of the Article, I analyze the extent to which several significant 
legal regimes in the Louisiana Civil Code—regimes very likely to 
affect individuals like Esther and Louis in moments of personal 
crisis—have incorporated open textured standards as a primary 
form of rule design, have resisted the trend toward discretionary 
remedialism by remaining tethered to relatively transparent rules, 
or have produced models of hybrid discretion. In my conclusion, I 
point to a number of additional concerns that should inform further 
scholarship that might examine whether Louisiana has assembled 
the proper mix of rules and standards as a mixed jurisdiction.  
                                                                                                             
 
opinions. This, of course, does not even include reported decisions from federal 
courts in Louisiana and the U.S. Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals that concern 
private Louisiana law and also advance Louisiana jurisprudence. By contrast, 
the 2010 edition of Scots Law Times, Scotland’s official reporter, contains one 
thick volume of reports from the Court of Session and other appellate courts, 
and one slim volume of reports of decisions of the Sherriff Courts of Scotland, 
the Scottish Land Court, and the Lands Tribunal for Scotland. Similarly, the 
2010 edition of Scottish Civil Law Reports, published by the Law Society of 
Scotland, contains only 815 pages. Yet Louisiana has a current population of 
only 4,574,836, see U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, Louisiana, http://quickfacts.census. 
gov/qfd/states/22000.html (last visited Jan. 28, 2012), whereas Scotland has a 
current population of approximately 5.2 million people. See Population of 
Scotland, SCOTLAND.ORG, http://www.scotland.org/facts/population/ (last visited 
Jan. 28, 2012). 
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* * * 
 
First, a few more words about Esther and Louis are in order. 
Some readers will naturally wonder why this Article focuses on 
private individuals like Esther and Louis and the legal problems 
generated by some of their most private decisions and intimate 
crises. Put differently, why ignore juridical entities like businesses 
and firms and the vast world of commercial transactions? I have 
three answers.  
First, in Louisiana (as in France), our leading scholars have 
always told law students and the community at large that the Civil 
Code is a kind of everyman’s handbook for life.14 In theory, it tells 
us what rights and obligations are created at birth. It provides the 
organizational framework for the family. It tells us how we can 
acquire and dispose of property during our lives, what kind of 
contracts we can make, and what can happen to our property and 
obligations at death. And it supposedly tells us all of this in a non-
technical language the average citizen can understand without the 
need for consulting a lawyer.15 If this civilian folklore is true,16 
then our Civil Code may indeed have a communicative and 
signaling function that is more powerful than the guidance 
provided by statutes or case law in common law jurisdictions that 
deal with the same subjects. If this is so, it is particularly 
appropriate to reflect on how our Civil Code structures the 
behavior-inducing directives it provides for some of these most 
significant moments in our private lives.  
The second reason I have chosen to focus on the largely 
personal problems of Esther and Louis is that I believe the 
consequences of a lawgiver’s choice between rules and standards 
in designing a legal order are more important for individuals like 
them than they are for businesses, corporations, and other 
sophisticated institutions that can, and frequently do, consult 
lawyers about their pending transactions and contract around legal 
directives whose certain (or uncertain) outcomes they do not like. 
In other words, private individuals have more at stake in the rules 
versus standards contest, particularly when new rules and standards 
                                                                                                             
 14. The canonical source for this idea in the modern era is Colonel John H. 
Tucker, Jr., Foreword, THE LOUISIANA CIVIL CODE, LVII (A.N. Yiannopoulos 
ed., 2011). 
 15. SHAEL HERMAN, THE LOUISIANA CIVIL CODE: A EUROPEAN LEGACY 
FOR THE UNITED STATES 11 (1993); JOHN HENRY MERRYMAN & ROGELIO 
PÉREZ-PERDOMO, THE CIVIL LAW TRADITION 29 (3d ed. 2007).  
 16. See MERRYMAN & PÉREZ-PERDOMO, supra note 15, at 42–47 
(commenting on the misleading nature and continuing appeal of the “folklore” 
of statutory interpretation in the civil law tradition). 
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are announced, because they are much less likely to engage in the 
sort of private ordering necessary to achieve an ideal mix between 
certainty and discretion if law makers fail to achieve it.  
My third reason for focusing on the personal and sometimes 
intimate problems of Esther and Louis is the simplest. Their 
problems are inherently interesting. And they are interesting 
because they are so common. They consist of the everyday joys 
and tragedies that confront many of us throughout our lives.  
I. PRELIMINARY TITLE: THINKING ABOUT RULES AND STANDARDS 
As we begin our journey through the Civil Code in search of 
rules, standards, and hybrid legal directives, let us take a moment 
to clarify what exactly we mean when we use these terms and to 
consider some of the most common normative justifications given 
for each kind of legal directive. In other words, let us reflect upon 
what makes a civil code article particularly rule-like or standard-
like and why either type of directive might be more or less 
appropriate in any given part of the Civil Code.  
A. Rule Based Decision Making 
A good place to begin to understand the difference between 
rules and standards is Kathleen Sullivan’s observation that a legal 
directive is “rule-like” when it “binds a decision maker to respond in 
a determinate way to the presence of delimited triggering facts . . . 
leaving irreducibly arbitrary and subjective value choices to be 
worked out elsewhere.”17 What Sullivan means is that a rule-like 
directive requires the decision maker to focus her attention on a 
narrowly circumscribed set of applicable facts and then to take 
those facts and mechanistically feed them into a precisely 
engineered calculus. The implicit governing metaphor for a rule-
based system of adjudication is that of a machine. The adjudicator 
serves merely as an engineer who keeps the machine well-oiled 
and in good repair, and whose own will does not affect the 
resolution of disputes.18 A classic rule will thus prevent the 
decision-maker from bringing her own values and policy 
judgments to bear on the resolution of a legal problem. In the 
                                                                                                             
 17. Sullivan, supra note 1, at 58.  
 18. See Jane B. Baron, The Contested Commitments of Property, 61 HAST. 
L. J. 917, 920 (2010) (introducing the metaphor of “the machine” to describe the 
underlying assumptions of “information theorists” who favor rule-like, 
exclusion based norms in property law). 
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language of jurisprudence, a true “rule” is associated with “legal 
formality” or “formal realizability.”19  
Rule-like norms are ubiquitous in any legal system, and they 
are plentiful in the Louisiana Civil Code. Consider the following: 
article 28 of the Louisiana Civil Code declares that a “natural 
person who has reached majority has capacity to make all sorts of 
juridical acts, unless otherwise provided by legislation.”20 Article 
29 adds that “majority is attained upon reaching the age of 
eighteen years.”21 Putting aside the complex problem of persons 
who lose their capacity to make juridical acts because of mental or 
physical infirmity,22 and ignoring for the moment any standard-like 
norms or rule-like exceptions bearing on the same subject that 
might complicate our analysis,23 these two articles appear to be 
create an archetypical rule. Before a person reaches the age of 
eighteen, no matter how wise she may be, she is generally 
forbidden from entering into juridical acts. But once a person 
reaches that magical age, no matter how foolish she really is, any 
juridical act appears to be possible. And notice how the two rules 
capture the underlying policy interest—people should be mature 
enough to appreciate the consequences of juridical acts before they 
are permitted to make them—in the text of the directives 
themselves. They spare the judge the task of making an 
individualized assessment of a particular person’s maturity. The 
decision making required by rules like these is thus often described 
as “strict,” “hard,” tight,” “mechanical,” and “formal.”24 Further, 
as these articles illustrate, and as C.J. Morrow, an influential 
civilian scholar in Louisiana, observed more than 50 years ago, 
extremely precise rules like these are frequently employed in the 
Civil Code for many quantitative determinations.25 
                                                                                                             
 19. Sullivan, supra note 1, at 58 n.232; Kennedy, supra note 1, at 1687–88. 
 20. LA. CIV. CODE art. 28 (2011). 
 21. LA. CIV. CODE art. 29 (2011). 
 22. See the new provisions governing interdiction of persons unable to care 
for their persons or property found in Book I, Title IX of the Louisiana Civil 
Code. LA. CIV. CODE arts. 389–99 (2011). 
 23. See infra notes 35–40 and accompanying text (discussing LA. CIV. 
CODE arts. 365–68 (2011) (providing for judicial emancipation, emancipation by 
marriage, and limited emancipation by authentic act), and LA. CIV. CODE art. 
1923 (2011) (providing that contracts made by an unemancipated minor cannot 
be rescinded when made “for the purpose of providing the minor with something 
necessary for his support or education, or for a purpose related to his 
business”)). 
 24. Sullivan, supra note 1, at 58 nn.231–32. 
 25. Clarence J. Morrow, Influence Du Code Civil au Point de Vue de la 
Technique Juridique: Louisiane, in LA SEMAINE INTERNATIONALE DE DROIT 
15–16 (Paris 1950) (reprinted 1954) (citing age of majority, along with many 
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Another common way of describing rule-based decision 
making is to note its emphasis on “categorization”—the process by 
which legal questions are resolved by identifying “differences in 
kind.”26 This trait quickly becomes apparent to Louisiana civil law 
students who begin their legal educations learning to distinguish 
between private and public things, movables and immovables, 
corporeals and incorporeals, real rights and personal obligations, 
predial servitudes and personal servitudes, and divisible 
obligations and indivisible ones. Like many civilian jurisdictions, 
Louisiana loves its categories and, as C.J. Morrow also pointed 
out, uses seemingly precise rules to enunciate the different species 
of things, rights, and obligations as well as the modes of creating 
and terminating rights and obligations.27  
One more crucial characteristic of rules is their tendency to 
force decision makers to view situations “ex ante”—to focus on 
what parties knew or could have known before they entered into 
certain personal or contractual relationships or acquired certain 
kinds of property.28 Indeed, an entire school of property law theory 
extols the virtue of plain, easily applied rules, particularly the 
fundamental principle that an owner of a thing generally has the 
right to exclude all non-owners from the sphere of his property. 
This theory is based on the insight that rules’ great comparative 
advantage within the universe of legal directives is precisely their 
ability to organize relationships ex ante, to provide clear signals up 
front about people’s entitlement to the tangible and intangible 
realms of property.29 
Paradoxically, even though classic rule-like norms require 
judges to analyze disputes from this ex ante perspective, hard-
edged rules are also often characterized by their ability to produce 
strong future effects. Rules, we are frequently told, tend to 
encourage individuals and juridical persons to organize their affairs 
with greater care and deliberation before they act. Clear and 
immutable rules have this beneficial “hortatory effect” precisely 
                                                                                                             
 
other provisions, as examples of extremely precise rules dealing with 
quantitative matters).  
 26. Sullivan, supra note 1, at 59. 
 27. Morrow, supra note 25, at 16. 
 28. Sullivan, supra note 1, at 63 n.259; see also Rose, supra note 1, at 591 
(citing Frank Easterbrook, The Supreme Court, 1983 Term—Foreword: The 
Court and the Economic System, 98 HARV. L. REV. 4, 10–11, 19–21 (1984)).  
 29. See John A. Lovett, Progressive Property in Action, The Land Reform 
(Scotland) Act 2003, 89 NEB. L. REV. 739, 746–750 (2010) (discussing the 
scholarship of Thomas Merrill and Henry E. Smith and their information 
processing cost theories of property law).  
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because they are forward looking from both the judge’s and the 
actor’s perspective.30 
B. Standard Based Decision Making 
A legal directive cast in the form of a prototypical standard, 
Kathleen Sullivan tells us, typically directs a decision maker to 
visualize a general background principle or policy goal and then 
asks the decision maker to apply that principle or goal to a 
particular factual situation taking into account all of the relevant 
facts and circumstances.31 This kind of decision making has been 
called “purposive.”32 Some might call it “pragmatic,” or perhaps 
lacking in “principle.”33 Others call it “shapeless” or “muddy.”34 
Before we evaluate these normative labels, let us examine how a 
typical standard works in practice by looking at a standard that 
lurks in the shadows of the seemingly direct rule on age of 
majority we just observed. 
Consider recently amended Civil Code article 366, which 
provides that a court “may order for good cause the full or limited 
emancipation of a minor sixteen years of age or older.”35 This legal 
directive actually contains one mechanistic rule—that children 
under the age of 16 are ineligible to make juridical acts no matter 
how mature. But it also gives a judge the power to exercise 
considerable discretion on two different fronts: (1) whether “good 
cause” exists to emancipate a 16 or 17 year old; and (2) whether 
such an emancipation should apply to all juridical acts or just a 
certain sub-class of them.36 Thus, the article gives a judge broad 
authority to consider the needs and circumstances of the minor, as 
well as the parents or tutor, and to design an emancipation order 
that is either broad or narrowly tailored to the situation.37 
Curiously, though, the very next provision of the Civil Code, 
                                                                                                             
 30. Atiyah, supra note 1, at 1249–50; Rose supra note 1, at 592 (explaining 
that ex ante oriented rules encourage people “to plan and to act carefully, 
knowing that no judicial cavalry will ride to their rescue later”). 
 31. Sullivan, supra note 1, at 58–59. 
 32. Id. at 60; see also AHAARN BARAK, PURPOSIVE INTERPRETATION IN 
LAW 88–96 (2005) (emphasizing the fundamental role of discretion in purposive 
interpretation). 
 33. Atiyah, supra note 1, at 1250–51. 
 34. Rose, supra note 1, at 579–80, 590–95. 
 35. LA. CIV. CODE art. 366 (2011) (emphasis added), revised by Act No. 
786, 2008 La. Acts 2977, 2978–79. 
 36. LA. CIV. CODE art. 366 (2011).  
 37. See id. cmts. d–e (discussing the scope of “limited” emancipation 
orders) & cmts. g–i (discussing detailed examples of potential “good cause” 
warranting emancipation). 
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article 367, inserts another mechanistic rule into the mix by 
providing that a minor, regardless of age, “is fully emancipated by 
marriage.”38 Finally, article 368 provides that a minor of 16 or 17 
may engage in certain juridical acts if he or she is authorized to do 
so by an “authentic act of limited emancipation” executed by the 
minor and his or her parents or tutor, without requiring any judicial 
approval.39 Adding another layer of complexity is article 1923, 
which provides that a contract made by an unemancipated minor 
cannot be rescinded “when made for the purpose of providing the 
minor with something necessary for his support or education, or 
for a purpose related to his business.”40 
The complete rule design picture that emerges, even in this 
seemingly straightforward area of private law regulation, is thus 
surprisingly complex. The Civil Code starts off with an apparently 
lucid rule (articles 28 and 29 establishing eighteen as the 
seemingly axiomatic age of majority), then muddies it with a zone 
of judicial discretion (article 366’s provision for judicial 
emancipation), then cordons off this discretion with two 
contradictory mechanistic rules (article 366’s specification of age 
sixteen as a floor for judicial emancipation and article 367’s 
automatic emancipation through marriage), and tops this all off 
with a zone for parent and child to emancipate jointly for limited 
purposes through an authentic act (article 368) and with a 
provision that provides for a kind of ex post ratification for a 
narrow sub-class of contracts executed by unemancipated minors 
(article 1923). We will see this pattern re-emerge more frequently 
and in ever greater complexity as we make our detailed journey in 
Books One, Two, and Three of this Article. 
Of course, open-textured standards have long been prominent 
features of the Louisiana Civil Code.41 They are found in the Civil 
Code’s admonition that “[g]ood faith shall govern the conduct of 
the obligor and the obligee in whatever pertains to the 
obligation,”42 its parallel requirement that “[c]ontracts must be 
performed in good faith,”43 in its maxim that a proprietor of an 
estate “cannot make any work on it, which may deprive his 
neighbor of the liberty of enjoying his own, or which may be the 
                                                                                                             
 38. LA. CIV. CODE art. 367 (2011), revised by Act No. 786, 2008 La. Acts 
2977, 2979–80. 
 39. LA. CIV. CODE art. 368 (2011), revised by Act No. 786, 2008 La. Acts 
2977, 2980. 
 40. LA. CIV. CODE art. 1923 (2011).  
 41. Morrow, supra note 25, at 17–18. 
 42. LA. CIV. CODE art. 1759 (2011). 
 43. LA. CIV. CODE art. 1983 (2011). 
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cause of any damage to him,”44 and its pronouncement that 
“[e]very act whatever of man that causes damage to another 
obliges him by whose fault it happened to repair it.”45 A judge 
applying these elastic standards of good faith and fault, as with the 
“good cause” standard for judicial emancipation, will typically be 
engaged in balancing more than categorizing, identifying 
“differences in degree” rather than “differences in kind.”46 Her 
decision making will thus often be described as “flexible,” “soft,” 
“loose,” “practical,” or “informal.”47  
Unlike rules’ typical ex ante orientation, classic standards such 
as Louisiana’s good faith and fault provisions, its obligation of the 
neighborhood principles, or its judicial emancipation provision, 
also characteristically allow decision makers to view decisions “ex 
post.”48 In other words, they enable decision makers to consider 
outcomes, to examine how relationships end, to visualize how 
bargains go awry, and to inquire whether a person’s actions were 
too risky or reasonable, self-interested or unexceptional, in light of 
all the circumstances. Paradoxically, although open-ended 
standards like these permit a decision maker to evaluate the effects 
of implementing a decision on all the affected parties currently 
involved in the dispute, some critics of standards suggest that these 
kinds of directives have the unfortunate effect of absolving the 
judge of considering the long-term consequences of any particular 
decision on society at large because each decision will have little 
or no precedential value.49 Of course, the same critique could be 
made of rules. They, too, could be faulted for allowing judges to 
ignore the immediate social consequences of their rulings and 
justify individual hardship in the name of long-term net benefits.  
Sometimes, too, the operational distinction between classic 
rules and standards is blurred by the fact that judges are required to 
engage in detailed and difficult fact-finding in cases calling for the 
application of otherwise clear rules. In these circumstances, rule-
based decision making might feel like standard-based decision 
making when in reality the judge is doing nothing more than 
applying an otherwise clear rule to rather muddy facts. A simple 
example from our consideration of minors and contractual capacity 
                                                                                                             
 44. LA. CIV. CODE art. 667 (2011). 
 45. LA. CIV. CODE art. 2315 (2011). 
 46. Sullivan, supra note 1, at 59. 
 47. Id. at 58 n.231. 
 48. Id. at 63 n.259. 
 49. See Atiyah, supra note 1, at 1259 (commenting that “the task of laying 
down broad rules of behavior for the future is now seen as that of Parliament, 
and the courts are therefore increasingly relegated to the task of solving 
disputes”). 
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would be article 1923, which allows for rescission of contracts 
made by an unemancipated minor “except when made for the 
purpose of providing the minor with something necessary for his 
support or education, or for a purpose related to his business.”50 A 
judge might be required to determine whether a particular contract 
really was necessary for the minor’s support, education or business 
endeavors. But the rule does not really invite an open-ended 
consideration of all relevant facts and circumstances and demand 
elaborate weighing of the relevant parties’ needs and interests. In 
short, judicial intervention in such cases should not be confused 
with judicial discretion. Rather, it is merely the planned-for 
exercise of judicial duty.51 
C. Rationales for Rules and Standards 
One could spend an entire career evaluating all the normative 
arguments in favor of rules and standards. For purposes of this 
Article, it will be enough to observe that the most common 
justifications for each kind of legal directive tend to fall under at 
least one of three general headings. It is also striking to observe 
how the justifications tend to mirror one another and dissolve into 
irreconcilable, and perhaps ultimately rhetorical, conflict.52  
1. Justification #1: Fairness 
Jurists who endorse rules as the ideal type of legal directive 
often justify their preference by asserting first and foremost that 
rules guaranty fairness. The tendency of rules to focus judicial 
decision making on ex ante conditions, their reliance on neutral 
categorization, and their self-operating quality all promote fairness 
and formal equality and avoid the evil of arbitrary and biased 
decision making. Paradoxically, proponents of standards justify 
their preference by arguing that standards promote fairness, too—
albeit of a different kind. By referring decision makers to ultimate 
policy objectives, an open-textured standard allows a decision 
maker to look past merely technical distinctions and treat cases that 
are substantively alike in similar ways. Standards can thus avoid 
the potential under-inclusiveness or over-inclusiveness of 
excessively rigid rules.53 
                                                                                                             
 50. LA. CIV. CODE art. 1923 (2011).  
 51. I am indebted to Kenneth Reid for this insight. 
 52. Rose, supra note 1, at 610. 
 53. See Kennedy, supra note 1, at 1689; see generally Sullivan, supra note 
1, at 62–66; SCHAUER, THINKING LIKE A LAWYER, supra note 1, at 200–02. 
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Consider for a moment our provisions concerning the age of 
majority. Civil Code article 29’s bright line specification of 18 as 
the general age of majority in Louisiana is fair, rule proponents 
will argue, because everyone will know where they stand. Persons 
17 or younger will know they lack the capacity to engage in 
juridical acts, unless they are married or unless they are at least 16 
and have been emancipated.54 Persons dealing with minors will be 
similarly forewarned. Persons 18 or older will not need to prove 
anything other than their age to establish their juridical capacity. 
Case closed.  
On the other hand, article 366’s provision for judges to 
emancipate minors between 16 and 18 years of age for “good 
cause” is also fair, standards supporters will claim, because it gives 
a teenager in difficult circumstances an opportunity to demonstrate 
individual maturity or why the circumstances require the capacity 
to make juridical acts. But we can also see how a legal directive 
that shares both rule-like and standard-like elements (for instance, 
article 1923’s protection of contracts made by unemancipated 
minors for “the purpose of providing the minor with something 
necessary for his support or education, or for purposes related to 
his business”) could accomplish some of the same ends as article 
366’s more classically open-ended standard. In short, we can see 
that a regard for fairness can justify rules, standards, and norms 
that operate somewhere in between. 
2. Justification #2: Efficiency 
Another equally common justification for hard-edged rules is 
that they maximize social welfare by encouraging productive 
economic activity and conservation of scarce judicial resources. 
Fixed and stable rules that clearly define contract and property 
rights ex ante, many jurists claim, establish the baseline certainty 
and predictability that are necessary before we will trade 
confidently with a stranger or someone beyond our own family or 
religious community.55 In a similar vein, clear rules can reduce 
pre-contract transaction costs for persons planning and executing 
trades and entering into complex transactions because traders will 
be more confident that their actions and contracts will trigger 
certain forms of judicial enforcement if something goes wrong.56 
Post-contract, crystalline rules can also reduce the parties’ need to 
                                                                                                             
 54. See supra notes 20–23 and accompanying text. 
 55. Rose, supra note 1, at 592, 601–02; Sullivan, supra note 1, at 62–63.  
 56. See Clifford G. Holderness, A Legal Foundation for Exchange, 14 J. 
LEGAL STUD. 321, 322–23 (1985). 
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engage in costly monitoring and self-help measures.57 Finally, 
clear rules reduce decision making costs for the entire legal 
system.58  
But standards can be efficient, too, their admirers point out. A 
generous and open-textured fault standard can give persons the 
confidence to go forth into the world, travel, and make purchases 
and bargains because, if a serious injury or breach occurs, there 
will at least be some chance that the party actually at fault—
another driver, a manufacturer, even a consumer who used a 
product in an unsafe manner—will be assigned legal responsibility. 
Similarly, a contractual standard like Louisiana’s imposition of the 
duty of good faith on the performance of obligations can 
discourage anti-social and exploitative behavior of sharp dealers 
who might otherwise try to take advantage of the gullible and 
naive by skirting up to the edge of what inflexible rules would 
otherwise allow.59 Thus, standards can encourage commerce and 
trade as much as rules.  
The inherent flexibility of standards can also enhance 
efficiency by allowing decision makers to take into account new 
circumstances and unexpected contingencies and avoid outcomes 
that produce excessive economic waste or socially intolerable 
forfeitures.60 Finally, standards can facilitate investment in 
productive economic ventures because private actors will be less 
fearful of being caught on the wrong side of an arbitrarily rigid 
rule.61 They allow contracting parties to avoid spending too much 
time negotiating to cover every possible contingency when reliance 
on a set of “socially understood conventions”—often associated 
with mud rules—is simply easier and cheaper.62 It turns out that 
both rules and standards can plausibly increase the net efficiency 
of our private economy, encourage trade, and boost aggregate 
social welfare if deployed in the right places. 
3. Justification #3: Promotion of Democratic Governance 
At perhaps the highest level of abstraction, both rules and 
standards can be justified on the basis that they promote 
democratic self-government, the very foundation of our ability to 
make decisions about the nature of our legal order and the type of 
                                                                                                             
 57. Rose, supra note 1, at 591. 
 58. Sullivan, supra note 1, at 63. 
 59. Rose, supra note 1, at 599–600; Sullivan, supra note 1, at 63, 66.  
 60. Rose, supra note 1, at 597–600 (drawing on James Gordley, Equality in 
Exchange, 69 CALIF. L. REV. 1587 (1981)); Sullivan, supra note 1, at 63, 66.  
 61. Rose, supra note 1, at 600. 
 62. Id. at 609. 
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society in which we live. Clear and simple rules, we are sometimes 
told, keep governmental power in check and preserve individual 
autonomy by limiting the power of unelected, unaccountable 
judiciaries. They separate law from politics by preventing judges 
from employing their own private assumptions about different 
persons’ needs and interests.63 Clear and mechanical rules also 
might help insulate judges and judicial decision making from the 
influence of bias attributable to rent-seeking, particularly in a 
jurisdiction like Louisiana that relies on an elected judiciary and 
does not impose particularly rigorous limits on judicial campaign 
contributions, a phenomenon we will address later.64 In sum, by 
restricting judges to the role of mechanical arbitrators, rules leave 
policy making in the only place it can properly reside—the hands 
of legislators.65 
Standards, however, can also promote democratic self-
governance in different ways. They can, their advocates claim, 
enhance the potential for distributive justice which, in turn, can 
make democracies more stable over time. They also allow 
government institutions and property relationships to respond more 
dynamically to changing social and economic circumstances.66 
And finally, by enabling judges to make decisions that are more 
appropriately contextual and by forcing judges to be more 
transparent about the factors that go into their decision making, 
they can enhance the accountability and legitimacy of the legal 
system in general. In short, open-ended standards can promote 
reasoned dialogue about the common good—an essential 
ingredient for democratic self-government.67 
We see then that rules and standards can be and often are 
justified by the same strands of justifications. The implicit message 
seems to be that both rules and standards are useful juridical tools 
in any legal order. The challenge for those responsible for 
designing a legal system is to deploy rules and standards in just the 
                                                                                                             
 63. See generally Sullivan, supra note 1, at 63–66. 
 64. See Vernon V. Palmer, The Recusal of American Judges in the Post-
Caperton Era: An Empirical Assessment of the Risk of Actual Bias in Decisions 
Involving Campaign Contributions, 10 GLOBAL JURIST, ISSUE 3, Art. 4 (2010), 
discussed infra at notes 335–337 and accompanying text. 
 65. Sullivan, supra note 1, at 63–66. 
 66. Conversely, though, it might be said that when legislation relies heavily 
on vague standards, this undermines democratic accountability by kicking 
difficult policy questions out of the legislature’s zone of responsibility.  
 67. See Sullivan, supra note 1, at 67–68 (relying on Frank I. Michaelman, 
Law’s Republic, 97 YALE L.J. 1493, 1493–1507 (1988); Frank I. Michaelman, 
The Supreme Court, 1985 Term—Foreword: Traces of Self-Government, 100 
HARV. L. REV. 4, 17–36 (1986); and Cass R. Sunstein, Beyond the Republican 
Revival, 97 YALE L.J. 1539, 1547–58 (1988)). 
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right places. We should deploy clear and simple rules where the 
need for formal realizeability, ex ante certainty, and predictability 
is greatest and where we want to privilege legislative choice over 
judicial flexibility. On the other hand, we should turn to standards 
where we need more elasticity in results, where the possibility of 
judicial flexibility provides individuals the necessary confidence to 
enter into long-term contractual or personal relationships, and 
where, at the meta-level, promoting reasoned dialogue is the most 
important republican end.  
As we travel through the Louisiana Civil Code with Esther and 
Louis in the rest of this Article, we can begin to assess whether 
Louisiana law makers have chosen the right places to deploy 
classic crystalline rules, open-ended standards, and hybrid 
innovations. 
II. BOOK ONE: MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE 
When Esther and Louis decided to marry, they assumed 
marriage was simply a matter of love. The wedding ceremony, 
after all, was a joyous event. Esther wore a simple white sundress 
designed by a friend who made costumes for Mardi Gras balls. 
Louis wore a slightly baggy, second hand tuxedo he had purchased 
on Decatur Street in the French Quarter.  
Their guests gathered on the bank of the Mississippi River in 
front of Jackson Square at sunset. Esther and Louis arrived in one 
of those horse drawn buggies that tourists hire for an hour. The 
couple recited their own vows, and a performance artist named 
Theo, who was also a minister in the Church of Universal Life, 
pronounced them husband and wife.  
After the ceremony, Esther and Louis hopped on their old 
bicycles and rode away as the sun slipped behind the twin spans of 
the Crescent City Connection. An hour later, they met their 
families and friends at an old warehouse in the Bywater and 
danced all night to the sound of a Klezmer jazz band. 
A. Entrance into Marriage 
As delightful as all this sounds, lawyers know that Esther and 
Louis’s decision to marry was also a fateful one. From the law’s 
perspective, their decision represented a choice to enter into a civil 
contract that produces significant legal consequences.68 Before we 
begin to assess those consequences, however, we can observe that 
                                                                                                             
 68. LA. CIV. CODE art. 86 (2011) (“Marriage is a legal relationship between 
a man and woman that is created by civil contract.”). 
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Esther and Louis were in one respect quite lucky. There was no 
apparent legal impediment to their decision,69 and they could thus 
act confidently without the need to consult any lawyers 
whatsoever.  
Their ease in entering into marriage resulted from several facts. 
Neither Esther nor Louis was currently married to anyone else.70 
They were members of the opposite sex.71 They were not related 
by blood or adoption.72 They were old enough to enter into 
juridical acts—and thus marry—on their own.73 All they had to do 
was give their mutual consent, freely and with discernment,74 at a 
simple ceremony performed by a qualified person at which they 
were both present.75 In short, despite its profound emotional, 
                                                                                                             
 69. See generally J-R Trahan, Impediments to Marriage in Scotland and 
Louisiana: An Historical-Comparative Investigation, in MIXED JURISDICTIONS 
COMPARED: PRIVATE LAW IN LOUISIANA AND SCOTLAND 173–207 (Vernon 
Valentine Palmer & Elspeth Christine Reid eds., 2010). 
 70. LA. CIV. CODE art. 88 (2011) (“A married person may not contract 
another marriage.”). Had either Esther or Louis been legally married to someone 
else at the time they entered into their marriage, this putative marriage would 
have continued to produce legal effects for the other party, “regardless of 
whether the latter remains in good faith, until the marriage is pronounced null or 
the latter party contracts a valid marriage.” LA. CIV. CODE art. 96 (2011). This 
important provision on the civil effects of the most common occurrence of a 
putative marriage itself takes the form of a crystalline rule and avoids any 
judicial inquiry into the other party’s state of mind. 
 71. LA. CIV. CODE art. 89 (2011) (“Persons of the same sex may not 
contract marriage with each other.”). 
 72. LA. CIV. CODE art. 90 (2011) (prohibiting marriage between ascendants 
and descendants and collaterals within the fourth degree, whether of whole or 
half blood, related by consanguinity or adoption). 
 73. See LA. CIV. CODE arts. 28–29 (2011), discussed supra notes 20–23. If 
either Esther or Louis had been younger than 18 years of age, that person could 
have sought a limited judicial emancipation for purposes of acquiring the legal 
capacity to marry. See LA. CIV. CODE art. 366 (2011). Alternatively, they could 
have sought the consent of both parents, a tutor or custodian of the minor, or a 
juvenile court judge. LA. CHILD. CODE ANN. arts. 1545 and 1547 (2004). 
 74. See LA. CIV. CODE art. 87 (2011) (listing as one of the requirements of 
marriage the “free consent of the parties to take each other as husband and wife, 
expressed at the ceremony”); LA. CIV. CODE art. 93 (2011) (“Consent is not free 
when given under duress or when given by a person incapable of discernment.”). 
The comments to article 93 indicate that “a person who is too young to 
understand the consequences of the marriage celebration” may be one of those 
classes of persons “incapable of discernment.” LA. CIV. CODE art. 93 cmt. d. But 
as discussed in supra note 73, a minor can still obtain authorization to marry 
through other means.  
 75. LA. CIV. CODE art. 91 (2011). If, for some reason, Esther and Louis’s 
minister friend, Theo, was not properly qualified to perform marriages, Esther 
and Louis could have remedied this defect by going to City Hall, presenting a 
valid marriage license or obtaining a new one, and then waiting three days for a 
judge or justice of the peace to marry them. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:241 (Supp. 
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economic and legal consequences, marriage is a remarkably easy 
juridical action to undertake in Louisiana—at least for persons like 
Esther and Louis. Although an alternative and supposedly more 
deliberative form of marriage, the “Covenant Marriage,”76 also 
exists in Louisiana, the standard marriage into which Esther and 
Louis have entered remains by far the most common choice.77 In 
sum, eligibility for marriage and the act of marrying itself are both 
governed by simple, direct rules. Judicial intervention is generally 
unnecessary and judicial discretion not a concern. 
B. Matrimonial Regimes and Community Property 
So what happens now that Louis and Esther are married? How 
does the law shape their interactions with each other, with their 
property, and with the world at large? At one time in Louisiana, 
Louis would have been deemed the “head and master” of the 
household, would have enjoyed sole authority to administer the 
marital assets, and could even have alienated their immovable 
property without Esther’s consent.78 Today, happily, the head and 
master rule and its patriarchal bias are only a historical relic. Now, 
we recognize that Esther and Louis owe each other “fidelity, 
support and assistance,”79 that they both “mutually assume the 
moral and material direction of the family,”80 that “each spouse 
acting alone may manage, control or dispose” of most community 
                                                                                                             
 
2011). Even this three-day waiting period could have been waived for “serious 
and meritorious reasons.” LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:242. 
 76. Parties entering into a covenant marriage must undergo mandatory pre-
marital counseling and must declare their intention to undertake a covenant 
marriage explicitly. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:272(A)–(B) (Supp. 2011). In 
addition, spouses in a covenant marriage are required to take “reasonable steps 
to preserve the marriage if marital difficulties arise, including marital 
counseling,” and cannot divorce quite as easily as in a standard marriage. 
Katherine Shaw Spaht, What’s Become of Louisiana Covenant Marriage 
through the Eyes of Social Scientists, 47 LOY. L. REV. 709, 711 (2001). For a 
critical appraisal of the counseling requirements for a covenant marriage, see 
Jeanne Louise Carriere, “It’s Déjà Vu All Over Again”: The Covenant Marriage 
Act in Popular Cultural Perception and Legal Reality, 72 TUL. L. REV. 1701, 
1705–17 (1998). For details on the more onerous grounds for divorce under 
covenant marriage, see Carriere, supra at 1718–19, and infra notes 113 and 117 
and accompanying text. 
 77. See Spaht, supra note 76, at 726 (reporting that only an estimated 5% of 
couples chose covenant marriage in Louisiana). 
 78. LA. CIV. CODE art. 2404 (1870), repealed by Act No. 709, 1979 La. Acts 
1857, 1857; Camel v. Waller, 526 So.2d 1086, 1090–91 (La. 1988).  
 79. LA. CIV. CODE art. 98 (2011). 
 80. LA. CIV. CODE art. 99 (2011). 
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property,81 and that neither spouse can alienate, encumber, or lease 
community immovables and other particularly important assets 
without the other’s consent.82 In short, Esther and Louis entered 
into a legal community theoretically governed by the principal of 
spousal equality.83 
Esther and Louis could in principle choose to enter into a 
matrimonial regime of “separation of property”84—that is, a 
regime in which each spouse would retain all of the income and 
fruits of his or her individual labor as his or her own separate 
property and each spouse, acting alone, could use, enjoy, and 
dispose of that property without the other’s consent.85 But to arrive 
at that decision and to implement it in the form of an appropriate 
prenuptial agreement or separation of property agreement, both 
Esther and Louis would need considerable assistance from 
attorneys,86 ideally separate counsel to advise each of them as to 
their unique interests. Hasty decisions to enter into separation of 
property agreements on the eve of a marriage without the advice of 
separate counsel can easily end in heartache,87 as can hastily 
drawn-up pre-nuptial agreements that do not meet the Civil Code’s 
strict requirements as to the necessary formalities.88 
Because of the time and expense involved in preparing such an 
agreement, not to mention the doubts about the other’s intentions 
the process might raise, Esther and Louis probably would not take 
advantage of this option. Instead, by simply marrying, without 
more, they would fall into Louisiana’s default matrimonial 
regime—the legal regime we call “the community of acquets and 
                                                                                                             
 81. LA. CIV. CODE art. 2346 (2011). 
 82. LA. CIV. CODE art. 2347 (2011). 
 83. See generally Carolyn J. Frantz & Hanoch Dagan, Properties of 
Marriage, 104 COLUM. L. REV. 75, 91–94 (2004) (discussing the principle of 
equality in marriage). 
 84. LA. CIV. CODE arts. 2328, 2329 & 2370 (2011). 
 85. LA. CIV. CODE art. 2371 (2011). 
 86. See generally ROBERT C. LOWE, 2 LA. PRAC. DIVORCE §§ 4:1–4:45 and 
9:95–9:102 (2d ed. 2012). Lowe cautions that individuals seeking a separate 
property regime or any kind of prenuptial agreement must be warned of the 
complex issues involved for all parties. Id. at § 4:21. 
 87. Weinstein v. Weinstein, 62 So. 3d 878, 882–883 (La. Ct. App. 3d 2011) 
(enforcing prenuptial agreement executed by spouses the day before the 
wedding, even though it was prepared by lawyer–husband, as wife was advised 
to seek separate legal representation regarding agreement). 
 88. See Muller v. Muller, 72 So. 3d 364, 367–68 (La. Ct. App. 5th 2011) 
(holding that premarital matrimonial agreement was null and void ab initio 
where wife’s signature was not properly witnessed by a notary in compliance 
with Civil Code article 2331 and agreement was not otherwise duly 
acknowledged prior to marriage). 
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gains,”89 i.e., community property. In other words, the simple, 
initial rule establishing community property as the default marital 
regime produces powerful legal effects for a couple like Esther and 
Louis. 
Although this is not the place for an exhaustive analysis of 
Louisiana’s community property regime, its most salient 
characteristic for our purposes is that its provisions are among the 
most crystalline, “rule-like” legal directives in the Civil Code. 
Indeed, it is a regime that hinges almost entirely upon one of the 
classic rule-based decision making modes—classification. Every 
potential asset of either spouse must be classified as either 
community or separate,90 and the legal consequences that flow 
from this classification are essentially automatic.  
As partners in this legal community of acquets and gains, 
Esther and Louis will each now acquire a “present undivided one-
half interest” in any property classified as “community property.”91 
Most significantly, Louis’s income from his work as a sous-chef as 
well as Esther’s income from her work as a community organizer 
will both be considered community property if the income results 
from either spouse’s “effort, skill or industry” during the existence 
of the community.92 This rule reflects the fundamental policy 
underlying community property—the principle of equality and 
sharing within the household regardless of either spouse’s role as 
wage-earner or homemaker. It is a policy whose spirit Louisiana 
courts have always strived to enforce.93 
It is true that complex questions related to the proration and 
classification of various kinds of deferred compensation do arise in 
the case of fringe benefits, retirement and pension plan benefits, 
commissions on insurance policies, profit sharing plans, mineral 
royalties, and stock options, and that these matters may require 
extensive litigation and judicial subtlety to resolve.94 Nevertheless, 
the fundamental principle of equal sharing of compensation earned 
during the community makes it relatively easy for individuals like 
Esther and Louis to understand how the fruits of their labor during 
the existence of the community will be classified. 
                                                                                                             
 89. LA. CIV. CODE art. 2327 (2011). 
 90. LA. CIV. CODE art. 2335 (2011). 
 91. LA. CIV. CODE art. 2336 (2011). 
 92. LA. CIV. CODE art. 2338 (2011). Conversely, if income is paid during 
the existence of the community for work performed before the community was 
created, it will be separate property. KATHERINE S. SPAHT & RICHARD D. 
MORENO, MATRIMONIAL REGIMES § 3.3, at n.1 and accompanying text, in 16 
LOUISIANA CIVIL LAW TREATISE (3d ed. 2007). 
 93. SPAHT & MORENO, supra note 92, § 3.2. 
 94. See generally id. §§ 3.3–3.4. 
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The other categories of community property are also relatively 
easy to understand. Any property acquired with the spouses’ 
“community things or with community and separate things,” any 
property donated to the spouses “jointly,” any “natural and civil 
fruits” of their community property, and even “damages awarded 
for loss or injury” to their community assets, will all be considered 
community property.95 Thus, the automobile Esther and Louis will 
purchase with their community income, the house in Faubourg 
Marigny they will buy in the second year of their marriage, the 
furniture they acquire for the house, and the stocks and bonds they 
buy as investments (along with the accrued dividends and interest 
payments) will all fall into this shared pool of community property 
in which they both share an undivided one-half interest. Indeed, 
any assets in either spouse’s possession during the existence of the 
community will be presumed to be community property, although 
either spouse could attempt to rebut this presumption.96  
The only assets not falling into the default category of 
community property would include: (1) things either spouse 
acquired prior to the marriage (in their case probably very little);97 
(2) property acquired by either with separate things or with 
separate and community things when the value of the latter is 
inconsequential (again, probably very little in this case);98 (3) 
property acquired by donation to either spouse individually or by 
inheritance (undoubtedly the most important category of separate 
things); and (4) most damages awards,99 including personal injury 
damages sustained during the existence of the community, unless 
the personal injury award compensates for the loss of community 
                                                                                                             
 95. LA. CIV. CODE art. 2338 (2011). 
 96. LA. CIV. CODE art. 2340 (2011). Although the spouse seeking to rebut 
this presumption and establish the existence of separate property bears the 
burden of proof, this burden can be met when there is clear evidence for 
instance, that immovable property held in the name of both spouses was, in fact, 
purchased by, paid for, and maintained by one of the spouse’s parents for his 
own interest and that of his children. Hoover v. Hoover, 62 So. 3d 765, 770–71 
(La. Ct. App. 1st 2011). 
 97. LA. CIV. CODE art. 2341 (2011). 
 98. Id. 
 99. See id. (classifying as separate property “damages awarded to a spouse 
in an action for breach of contract against the other spouse or for the loss 
sustained as a result of fraud or bad faith in the management of community 
property by the other spouse;” and “damages or other indemnity awarded to a 
spouse in connection with the management of his separate property”). 
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earnings or expenses incurred by the community as a result of the 
injury.100  
This is not difficult classification work. In general, the Civil 
Code’s community property regime is governed by remarkably 
clear and straightforward ground rules. Fine tuning the degree of 
ownership of individual assets is generally not allowed. When 
Esther and Louis’s community of acquets and gains eventually 
terminates (either upon death, divorce, or perhaps a non-divorce 
termination agreement),101 their lawyers should be able to classify 
their assets as either community or separate and determine their 
eligibility for a community property partition,102 or for distribution 
to their respective heirs and legatees,103 with a relatively high 
degree of confidence and with little need for extensive research 
and analysis.104 Thus, so far in our journey, the Civil Code has 
lived up to expectations. The rights of spouses are protected by 
rules, not standards. It speaks in relatively clear language that most 
reasonably well educated people can understand. Judicial 
discretion has been kept at bay. 
 
* * * 
 
After Esther and Louis’s marriage, they both continued to work 
at their old jobs. Eventually, though, Louis went back to college, 
finished his undergraduate degree, and obtained a new job as a 
manager of a local restaurant chain. A year later, Louis entered 
business school full time in pursuit of an MBA. Esther kept 
working at her old job so that Louis could devote all his attention 
to his studies. On the weekends, Esther also worked as a waitress 
at an upscale New Orleans restaurant to earn extra money to 
cover their living expenses and some of Louis’s business school 
expenses.  
                                                                                                             
 100. LA. CIV. CODE art. 2344 (2011). See SPAHT & MORENO, supra note 92, 
§§ 3.20–3.26, at 154–72, for details on the allocation of personal injury awards 
and their various elements. 
 101. LA. CIV. CODE art. 2356 (2011). 
 102. LA. CIV. CODE art. 2369.8 (2011) (providing for right to demand 
“partition of former community property at any time”). For more on community 
property partition upon divorce, see infra notes 119–34 and accompanying text. 
 103. For a nice example of the straightforward application of community 
property principles to a variety of assets claimed by the legatee of a deceased 
spouse as against a surviving spouse, see Succession of Lefort, 52 So. 3d 999, 
1007–08 (La. Ct. App. 3d 2010) (dealing with house, substantial bank accounts, 
bench, table, and pattern china). 
 104. SPAHT & MORENO, supra note 92, § 3.1, at 71 (characterizing the Civil 
Code’s community property classification scheme as “a relatively simple one 
that has not changed substantially in modern times”). 
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Louis thrived at business school. He enjoyed collaborating 
with his fellow students, earned coveted internships, and upon 
graduation was offered a job with a fast growing corporation 
called Green Earth, which operated high end supermarkets 
specializing in organic and healthy foods. In his first several years 
with Green Earth, Louis made rapid progress through the 
corporate hierarchy. 
Esther and Louis had their first child, Talia, when Esther was 
32 and Louis was 30. Esther stopped working outside the home. 
She would stay home only until Talia reached school age, Esther 
thought. After that she might go back to graduate school herself 
and obtain an advanced degree of her own.  
Esther and Louis’s second child, Joshua, was born two years 
later. Now it made even more sense for Esther to stay at home and 
look after the children. Louis was earning good money and getting 
steady promotions at Green Earth. 
Time flew by. The children grew. Esther was always busy: 
organizing the children’s activities; managing the household; 
volunteering at the children’s school. She applied for a few jobs, 
but she was either over-qualified or under-qualified, given that she 
lacked a professional degree.  
Meanwhile Louis flourished at Green Earth and was promoted 
to vice-president. The CEO told Louis he was a leading candidate 
to take over an entire division. He might even be CEO one day. 
But then one night after dinner, after the kids had been put to 
bed, Louis told Esther he wanted a trial separation. He wanted to 
have more independence. He didn’t feel there was any magic in 
their relationship any more.  
Esther was not totally surprised. She had suspected something 
was amiss for months. Esther had overheard Louis speaking to 
someone on his cell phone on the back porch late at night several 
weeks earlier. When he came inside Louis had said it was an 
urgent problem at work.  
C. Exit from Marriage 
Let us assume that, after an awkward and painful week of long 
conversations and tears, Louis moves out of the family home. 
Esther now goes to see a lawyer. Her attorney’s name is Stephanie, 
a certified family law specialist in Louisiana who has ten years of 
experience representing individual clients in domestic matters. 
What advice can Stephanie give Esther based on her experience 
and knowledge of Louisiana law?  
If Esther files a petition for a divorce now, Stephanie will 
explain, she must wait a year before a divorce will be granted. 
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Stephanie will state that there are two reasons for this delay: (1) the 
minor children, and (2) the fact that Esther and Louis have not 
previously lived separate and apart.105 In other words, Esther must 
now wait a year and then she will have to prove that she and Louis 
have lived separate and apart in the interim.106 Had there been no 
minor children, 180 days of living separate and apart would have 
sufficed.107 
An immediate divorce, Stephanie will add, is possible in 
Louisiana but more difficult to obtain. First, if Esther could prove 
that she and Louis had already been living separate and apart for a 
year, or for just six months had there been no minor children, at the 
time she files a petition, a divorce decree could be obtained right 
away.108 Second, an immediate divorce would follow if Esther can 
prove that Louis has either (a) committed adultery or (b) 
committed a felony and been sentenced to death or hard labor.109 
Louis’s suspected transgressions, Stephanie must advise Esther, 
might have been relevant in a divorce proceeding 50 years ago.110 
Today, however, they will be relevant only in the unlikely event 
that Louis seeks some form of post-separation financial support 
from her.111  
So what can we conclude after Esther’s brief initial interview 
with Stephanie? Divorce is a relatively easy step to take in 
Louisiana. The ability to exit from marriage is merely a matter of 
stating a preference, living apart for a limited period of time,112 and 
                                                                                                             
 105. See LA. CIV. CODE arts. 102, 103.1(2) (2011). 
 106. Id. 
 107. LA. CIV. CODE arts. 102, 103.1(1)(a) (2011). 
 108. LA. CIV. CODE arts. 103, 103.1 (2011). 
 109. LA. CIV. CODE arts. 103(2)–(3) (2011).  
 110. Louisiana’s fault based regime for divorce began to break down in the 
1950s when the legislature added part (9) to Article 138 of the 1870 Civil Code, 
Act No. 303, 1956 La. Acts 626, 626–27 (allowing for separation from bed and 
board when husband and wife voluntarily lived separate and apart for one year 
without reconciliation), amended article 139, and added Section 302 of Title 9 of 
the Louisiana Revised Statutes, Act. No. 618, 1954 La. Acts 1121, 1121. The 
cumulative effect of these changes was to allow for divorce upon living separate 
and apart for more than a year or after a separation from bed and board.  
 111. See infra notes 135–58 and accompanying text. 
 112. It is noteworthy, though, that Louisiana’s six month or one year waiting 
periods for no-fault divorce are both longer and shorter than those found in other 
states. See DOUGLAS E. EBRAMS ET AL., CONTEMPORARY FAMILY LAW 415–16 
(2006) (noting that some states like Kentucky require 180 days of residency in 
the state and 60 days of living separate and apart, other states like Oregon have 
no waiting period and no residency requirement, but that Rhode Island, Texas 
and Utah have the longest separation requirements (three years), along with 
substantial residency requirements). For a complete listing of waiting periods 
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then confirming the desire to part ways. There is no requirement 
for the party seeking the divorce to justify the decision or prove 
that the other party is at fault. Even for those who choose 
Louisiana’s more demanding covenant marriage regime, exit 
remains essentially a matter of right. The only difference is that the 
waiting periods for divorce are slightly longer for these supposedly 
more committed couples.113  
Louisiana’s legal directives governing exit from marriage are 
thus classic examples of transparent rules, easy for a lawyer to 
explain and a layman to comprehend. They are a model of rule-like 
rules. They typify the Civil Code’s predilection for deploying 
straight forward, sharp edged rules when the quantification of 
sufficient time for some legal right to accrue is at stake. They 
provide certainty and predictability and prevent judges from using 
their own moral or religious values in deciding whether and when 
a petitioning spouse is entitled to obtain a divorce.  
The very immutability and transparency of the Civil Code’s 
rules governing eligibility for divorce are essential for ensuring 
that marriage resembles what some scholars call a “liberal 
commons,”114 a relationship of sharing which can nevertheless be 
terminated voluntarily, with relative ease and without inquiry into 
which party is morally blameworthy for the marriage’s demise.115 
These crystalline, non-discretionary, rule-like exit rights are clearly 
appropriate if Louisiana is committed to guaranteeing that 
marriage remains a liberal commons. Not only do such rules curb 
the potential for either spouse to act abusively toward the other,116 
they allow spouses who are in fact suffering from emotional, 
                                                                                                             
 
and residency requirements on a state-by-state basis prepared by the staff of the 
Family Law Quarterly, see Charts, 43 FAM. L.Q. 972, 976 (2009).  
 113. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 9:307(A)(3) (2008) (divorce available if non-
petitioning spouse in a covenant marriage has abandoned the marital domicile 
for one year); 9:307(A)(5) (2008) (divorce available in covenant marriage upon 
proof the spouses have been living separate and apart for two years without 
reconciliation). 
 114. See Hanoch Dagan & Michael A. Heller, The Liberal Commons, 110 
YALE L. J. 549 (2001). 
 115. The law governing divorce was not always this way. See Atiyah, supra 
note 1, at 1256 (lamenting the disappearance of the hortatory quality of 
matrimonial and divorce law and the fact that “[a] divorce has come to be 
treated as though it were an accident in which, generally speaking, the search for 
someone to blame is largely futile, and the best policy is simply to clear up the 
mess as painlessly and fairly as possible”).  
 116. See Frantz & Dagan, supra note 83, at 93; Dagan & Heller, supra note 
114, at 568.  
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mental, or physical abuse to exit from the relationship relatively 
quickly and safely.117 
To say that exit from marriage is protected as an absolute right 
does not mean that divorce is costless or easy. Far from it. Many 
difficult legal issues can still arise and the legal system can impose 
substantial burdens on parties like Esther and Louis. 
 
* * * 
 
Let us assume that Esther goes ahead and files a petition for 
divorce. As long as the two spouses do not appear to reconcile, a 
circumstance that might necessitate some judicial intervention,118 a 
divorce petition will be granted in due course and Esther and 
Louis’s marriage will come to an end.  
But what then? What will happen to the family home and the 
couple’s other community property? Will either party owe the 
other any continuing obligation of support? Will Louis owe Esther 
any compensation for her contributions to his education and 
career? Who will have custody of the minor children? And who 
will be obligated to provide financially for the children’s support? 
As we turn to these issues, we will see that the Civil Code’s 
reliance on crystalline rules begins to break down, but perhaps not 
as fully as we might have expected. 
D. Community Property Partition 
Let us tackle Esther and Louis’s community property first. If 
Esther and Louis could agree on their own plan of partition, it 
                                                                                                             
 117. Cf. Carriere, supra note 76, at 1714–17 (discussing how the Louisiana 
Covenant Marriage Act’s requirements of pre-divorce counseling may put 
women facing spousal abuse in greater physical danger). 
 118. The Civil Code introduces a note of judicial discretion into the 
otherwise immutable rules governing divorce when it provides in article 104 that 
the “cause of action for divorce is extinguished by the reconciliation of the 
parties.” LA. CIV. CODE art. 104 (2011). As the comment to this article explains, 
reconciliation is a “question of fact to be decided in accordance with established 
jurisprudential guidelines.” Id. cmt. As the cases demonstrate, neither acts of 
kindness nor even occasional sexual encounters are sufficient to constitute 
reconciliation for most Louisiana courts. See Woods v. Woods, 660 So. 2d 134, 
135–36 (La. Ct. App. 2d 1995) (wife’s affectionate and forgiving behavior did 
not constitute reconciliation); Eppling v. Eppling, 537 So. 2d 814, 819 (La. Ct. 
App. 5th 1989) (one isolated act of sexual intercourse not sufficient to constitute 
reconciliation). Reconciliation defenses are pursued primarily to eliminate a 
fault ground for divorce—and, thus, wipe the slate clean so to speak—for 
purposes of a permanent alimony claim in connection with a divorce petition. 
Noto v. Noto, 41 So. 3d 1175, 1180 (La. Ct. App. 5th 2010); Hamsa v. Hamsa, 
668 So. 2d 1209, 1211 (La. Ct. App. 5th 1996). 
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would be enforced subject to the limitations on any juridical act of 
this nature.119 As long as this extrajudicial partition plan does not 
run afoul of any of the traditional vices of consent for conventional 
obligations,120 it would endure. Further, because of the general 
clarity of Louisiana’s community property classification rules, it 
may in fact be possible for Esther and Louis to achieve an 
equitable extrajudicial partition without any extraordinary expense 
and need for litigation.121 In short, up to now, crystalline rules may 
still rule the day. 
Complexity, considerable judicial discretion, and much more 
potential for unhappiness, however, will emerge if Esther and 
Louis cannot agree on their own partition plan. The primary source 
of this judicial discretion was the 1982 enactment of Louisiana 
Revised Statutes section 9:2801, a special procedural regime 
governing judicial partitions of community property between 
spouses—i.e., other than at death of one of the spouses.122 With the 
enactment of this regime, Louisiana turned away from an “item 
theory” approach to community property partition, in which each 
individual object of the community had to be analyzed for its 
suitability to partition, and replaced it with an “aggregate theory” 
of partition.123  
Under the new approach, a court must first value all of the 
community assets and liabilities to be partitioned and adjudicate 
any outstanding claims between the parties.124 It must then “divide 
the community assets and liabilities so that each spouse receives 
property of an equal net value.”125 Although a court is required to 
allocate or assign all of the community assets and liabilities, it is 
given vast discretion to divide a particular asset equally or 
unequally and to allocate any particular asset to one of the spouses 
in its entirety.126 So, for example, a court could award Esther the 
family home in New Orleans and Louis the most valuable 
automobile and the vacation condominium in Florida. Then the 
                                                                                                             
 119. See SPAHT & MORENO, supra note 92, § 7.21, at 661–69. 
 120. See generally id. §§ 7.21–7.25, at 661–87. 
 121. See supra notes 90–104 and accompanying text. 
 122. SPAHT & MORENO, supra note 92, § 7.26, at 688–89. Section 9:2801 
only applies to partitions of community property between spouses. The general 
rules of partition govern the partition of former community property owned in 
indivision by one former spouse and heirs or legatees of the other. In re 
Sessions, 23 So. 3d 954, 959 (La. Ct. App. 1st 2009). 
 123. SPAHT & MORENO, supra note 92, § 7.26, at 688.  
 124. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:2801.A(4)(a) (2009). 
 125. Id. § 9:2801(A)(4)(b) (emphasis added). 
 126. Id. § 9:2801(A)(4)(c). 
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court would divide the couple’s investment account more or less 
evenly, as long as the net values balanced out.  
In devising this gross property allocation, the court will be 
guided only by a short list of discretion-expanding factors: “the 
nature and source of the asset or liability, the economic condition 
of each spouse, and any other circumstances the court deems 
relevant.”127 In the end, the court does not even need to allocate all 
the assets and liabilities evenly. If the allocation “results in an 
unequal net distribution,” the court can order “the payment of an 
equalizing sum of money, either cash or deferred, secured or 
unsecured, upon such terms and conditions as the court shall 
direct.”128 If the court decides that the allocation of a particular 
asset to one spouse or the other is inequitable, it can also order the 
drawing of lots, a partition by private sale, or even a partition by 
licitation (a judicial sale), although this final option is supposed to 
be a last resort.129 
If Esther and Louis’s community property consisted only of 
their house, automobiles, bank accounts, furniture, other movable 
belongings, and stocks and bonds, the community property 
partition under this regime would be fairly predictable. But we still 
have not addressed what might well be the most valuable assets of 
a couple like Esther and Louis—pension and retirement benefits. 
To partition these kinds of assets we have to look well beyond the 
Civil Code and even the Revised Statutes. 
In a series of seminal decisions beginning in the 1970s,130 the 
Louisiana Supreme Court eschewed what had been a deceptively 
simple but potentially punitive bright line approach to the 
classification and partition of pension and retirement benefits and 
developed a largely equitable, and inherently discretionary, 
framework. For our purposes it is enough to observe that: (1) 
federal regulation of employee retirement benefits has significantly 
                                                                                                             
 127. Id. 
 128. Id. § 9:2801(A)(4)(d). What a court cannot do, however, is duck the 
responsibility of allocating or assigning to one spouse or the other all of the 
spouse’s community property. A community property partition order that fails to 
allocate an asset will be subject to remand. Goines v. Goines, 62 So. 3d 193, 204 
(La. Ct. App. 5th 2011). Such an order is also subject to remand if it fails to 
assign value to all of the assets or liabilities of the community, divide them, and 
determine whether an equalizing payment is necessary. Id. 
 129. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:2801(A)(4)(e)–(f) (2009). 
 130. See T.L. James & Co., Inc. v. Montgomery, 332 So. 2d 834 (La. 1975); 
Sims v. Sims, 358 So. 2d 919 (La. 1978); Hare v. Hodgins, 586 So. 2d 118 (La. 
1991); Frazier v. Harper, 600 So. 2d 59 (La. 1992); Bailey v. Bailey, 708 So. 2d 
354 (La. 1998). 
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impacted this jurisprudence;131 (2) pursuant to this jurisprudence, 
courts now have discretion to choose between a “reserve 
jurisdiction/fixed percentage” method of classifying the spouse’s 
interests and an immediate “present cash value” distribution 
approach; and (3) courts must consider a number of equitable 
factors in choosing the appropriate valuation and division 
method.132  
The court’s work in this area taught Louisiana lawyers and 
judges to avoid a one-shot, all-or-nothing focus on either the 
moment when pension benefit rights vested or the moment the 
community terminated. Instead, judges learned to balance the 
interests of both the employee and non-employee spouse, to 
subject both of them to the contingencies of fate (such as sudden 
unemployment or premature death), and to impose a continuing 
duty of good faith on the employee spouse who is responsible for 
managing the pension interests on which both spouses will 
ultimately depend.133  
At this point, we have now entered a legal landscape where 
rules have given way to classic standards. Here, despite the 
traditional civilian preference for certainty and predictability in 
dealing with property, the turn to discretionary remedialism 
orchestrated by the legislature (through the community property 
partition statute) and by the Louisiana Supreme Court was 
especially appropriate given the complexity of the decision making 
task that pension retirement benefit partition presented. The 
legislature might, of course, have tried to devise a set of fixed rules 
to govern community property partition in this context. But, 
perhaps, it wisely left the hard work of devising workable 
principles and dividing a lifetime of community property interests 
to individual judges who can consider both spouses’ needs and 
interests as they move forward in their newly autonomous lives.134 
 
 
                                                                                                             
 131. See, e.g., Retirement Equity Act of 1984 (REA), Pub. L. No. 98-397, 98 
Stat. 1426 (1984); Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA), 
Pub. L. No. 93-406, 88 Stat. 829 (1974) (both discussed in SPAHT & MORENO, 
supra note 92, § 7.29, at 725). 
 132. See SPAHT & MORENO, supra note 92, § 7.29, at 733–46. 
 133. Dian Tooley Arruebarrena, Applying Louisiana’s Community Property 
Principles to Pensions, 33 LOY. L. REV. 241, 265 (1987); SPAHT & MORENO, 
supra note 92, at § 7.29, at 733–46. 
 134. Perhaps another benefit of this particular turn toward discretion is that it 
may have encouraged many divorcing couples to accept extrajudicial partition 
plans to avoid the risk of potentially undesirable judicial solutions. 
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E. Claims for Interim or Permanent Periodic Support (Alimony) 
Now that we have analyzed the mixture of predictability and 
uncertainty that community property partition has in store for 
Esther and Louis, let us address Esther’s next set of urgent 
questions. As she has not worked full time for years, and as her 
income earning potential is not particularly great, can Esther 
demand that Louis share a portion of his substantial salary from 
Green Earth with her? If so, can she make such a demand only 
during the pendency of the divorce proceeding? Or can she obtain 
a share of his income even after the divorce is final? If so, for how 
long? Will she be required to go back to work before Louis is 
compelled to share his income with her?  
Initially, Esther’s lawyer must give Esther cautious answers as 
all of these issues are addressed by classically open-textured 
standards in the first instance. However, upon further reflection, 
Stephanie will draw on her knowledge of Louisiana judicial 
decisions and describe the evolution of certain judicial norms that 
function, in some ways, like classical rules. In the end, a fairly 
clear picture of what Esther can expect in the way of alimony 
support from Louis will emerge. 
Stephanie would first tell Esther that in Louisiana any spouse’s 
ability to claim some kind of periodic support—either during the 
pendency of a divorce proceeding (“interim periodic support”) or 
after the divorce is final (“final periodic support”)—fundamentally 
depends on the claimant spouse’s ability to convince a court she is 
“in need of support” and, for purposes of final periodic support, 
was also “free from fault” prior to the divorce petition.135 In 
Esther’s case, establishing freedom from fault is probably not an 
especially important issue. If Louis were to seek final periodic 
support from Esther, however, freedom from fault could well be a 
significant battle ground. A court would then have ample scope to 
make a highly fact sensitive, contextualized decision about 
whether some alleged misconduct during the marriage rose to the 
level of one of the previously existing fault grounds for legal 
separation and divorce under prior versions of the Civil Code (e.g., 
adultery, habitual intemperance, excesses, cruel treatment or 
outrages that made living together insupportable, public 
defamation, abandonment) and whether that conduct might be a 
                                                                                                             
 135. LA. CIV. CODE arts. 111, 112 (2011); Allen v. Allen, 648 So. 2d. 359, 
361 (La. 1994) (“Although no-fault divorce is now available, freedom from fault 
is still necessary for permanent alimony.”). 
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legitimate response to the other spouse’s fault.136 But putting aside 
the question of fault for now, let us examine more closely the 
primary obstacle to Esther’s ability to obtain alimony—
establishing her need for support. 
If Esther is merely asking for support while her divorce 
proceeding is pending, Stephanie can advise her that a court will 
consider not only her need and Louis’s ability to pay, but also, 
happily for Esther, her standard of living during the marriage.137 At 
first, this might offer Esther some comfort because it suggests 
Louisiana courts will ensure that a spouse like her who has not 
recently worked outside the home will not suffer a dramatic 
reduction in living standard while she adjusts to an impending 
termination of her marriage.138 But Esther’s relief may quickly turn 
to gloom after Stephanie points out that some courts presumptively 
require a spouse who has not worked outside the home during the 
marriage due to child care responsibilities to seek work (or at least 
to seek the training necessary to gain employment), and that a 
failure in this regard allows the court to determine the spouse’s 
earning capacity and impute that capacity to her for purposes of 
evaluating her need for interim support.139 That some courts justify 
                                                                                                             
 136. LA. CIV. CODE art. 111 cmt. c (2011). See also LA. CIV. CODE art. 138 
(1870) (Compiled Edition 1978) (listing prior grounds for separation from bed 
and board); LA. CIV. CODE art. 160 (1870) (Compiled Edition 1978); Allen, 648 
So. 2d at 362. The requirement of freedom from fault at the time a divorce 
proceeding is commenced is a classic hybrid legal directive. The temporal 
requirement of freedom from fault before the divorce petition is filed is rule-
like. But the determination of the existence of “fault” requires both objective 
fact-finding and subjective value judgments. See, e.g., Allen, 648 So. 2d at 362–
63; Diggs v. Diggs, 6 So. 3d 1030, 1032–33 (La. Ct. App. 3d 2009); LOWE, 
supra note 86, § 8:164, at 823–24 (discussing pre-1997 jurisprudence on 
lifestyle). For a detailed discussion of other fault grounds, see Lowe, supra note 
86, §§ 8:165–8:173. 
 137. See LA. CIV. CODE art. 113 (2011). 
 138. McFall v. Armstrong, 50 So. 3d 904, 906–07 (La. Ct. App. 5th 2010); 
Brown v. Brown, 31 So. 3d 532, 535 (La. Ct. App. 2d 2010); Koeniger v. 
Koeniger, 10 So. 3d 271, 272 (La. Ct. App. 4th 2009). 
 139. See Molony v. Harris, 51 So. 3d 752, 760–61 (La. Ct. App. 4th 2010) 
(affirming trial court’s imputation of full-time earning capacity to claimant ex-
wife despite her reduced work hours resulting from court mandated attendance 
of Alcoholics Anonymous meetings); Kirkpatrick v. Kirkpatrick, 948 So. 2d 
390, 393–95 (La. Ct. App. 2d 2007) (affirming imputation of $2000 income for 
six months and $3000 thereafter based on the finding that wife was voluntarily 
underemployed, had occasionally worked as a licensed counselor ten years 
before divorce and could have immediately obtained counseling work when her 
husband filed for divorce); Richard v. Richard, 577 So. 2d 110, 112 (La. Ct. 
App. 1st 1991) (reducing alimony pendente lite award by $800 per month 
because wife had completed college degree in sociology and been offered two 
counseling jobs, even though jobs were problematic both professionally and 
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this practice of earning capacity imputation on grounds of sexual 
equality in the workplace probably will not make Esther feel any 
better.140 
Turning to the question of final periodic support, Esther’s 
attorney would advise that a court’s discretion will again be 
focused on Esther’s “need of support” and Louis’s ability to pay.141 
Now, however, that discretion is channeled by a list of factors 
provided by the Civil Code, including: 
(1) The income and means of the parties, including the 
liquidity of such means.  
(2) The financial obligations of the parties.  
(3) The earning capacity of the parties. 
(4) The effect of custody of children upon a party’s earning 
capacity. 
(5) The time necessary for the claimant to acquire appropriate 
education, training, or employment. 
(6) The health and age of the parties. 
(7) The duration of the marriage. 
(8) The tax consequences to either or both parties.142 
The only hard and fast limit to judicial discretion here is the 
Civil Code’s proscription that the amount of any final periodic 
award Esther can claim cannot exceed “one third of the obligor’s 
[Louis’s] net income.”143  
If Esther asks what all of these factors actually mean for her, 
Stephanie would first admit that a trial court’s discretion in 
applying them is quite considerable,144 but she could also describe 
broad trends in the case law interpreting these open-textured 
standards. Stephanie could explain, for instance, that, as recently as 
the 1970s, Louisiana courts routinely presumed that a divorced 
mother who had remained at home to take care of minor children 
was eligible to receive some kind a permanent alimony award.145 
                                                                                                             
 
personally). But see McFall, 50 So. 3d at 907 (attributing only minimum wage 
salary to ex-wife claiming interim support because she had not worked as 
medical technician since 1995 and her skills were “obsolete or of no use”). 
 140. See Kirkpatrick, 948 So. 2d at 393–94. 
 141. LA. CIV. CODE art. 112(A) (2011). 
 142. LA. CIV. CODE art. 112(B) (2011). 
 143. LA. CIV. CODE art. 112(C) (2011). 
 144. Earle v. Earle, 998 So. 2d 828, 836 (La. Ct. App. 2d 2008); see also 
Noto v. Noto, 41 So. 3d 1175, 1181 (La. Ct. App. 5th 2010).  
 145. La Hood v. La Hood, 340 So. 2d 624. 626 (La. Ct. App. 2d 1976); Ward 
v. Ward, 332 So. 2d 868, 836 (La. Ct. App. 4th 1976) (per curium, on application 
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By the mid to late 1990s, however, this presumption seemed to 
have eroded away and even ex-wives with school-age children 
were often expected to go back to work to support themselves and 
their children unless there were special circumstances such as 
medical limitations of a child or spouse.146 
Yet in a few recent cases involving claims for permanent 
alimony, courts seem to have become more solicitous toward a 
spouse who has not worked outside the home for an extended 
period of time, whose current earning potential may be limited, and 
who may need time to retrain and adjust to the demands of the 
current employment market.147 At the same time, Stephanie will 
note, the amount of any permanent support award will be focused 
primarily on what is required for her “maintenance” (that is, items 
like food, shelter, clothing, transportation, medical and drug 
expenses, utilities, household necessities, and income tax liability 
generated by alimony payments) and most likely will not take into 
account the standard of living the claimant spouse enjoyed during 
the marriage.148 On the other hand, it is clear that, in fashioning a 
                                                                                                             
 
for rehearing), aff’d in part and rev’d in part, 339 So.2d 839 (La. 1976); Gravel v. 
Gravel, 331 So. 2d 580, 582 (La. Ct. App. 3d 1976). 
 146. Glaude v. Glaude, 715 So. 2d 682, 686 (La. Ct. App. 3d 1998) (wife’s 
failure to complete job application, in absence of medical restrictions, supported 
finding that she was capable of providing for her own needs, even though she 
was primary caretaker of young, school age children); Veron v. Veron, 657 So. 
2d 156 (La. Ct. App. 3d 1995), rev’d, 663 So. 2d 726 (La. 1995) (mem.), on 
remand, 688 So. 2d 1076 (La. Ct. App. 3d 1996) (holding that wife and 
domiciliary parent who was qualified to work as school teacher did not warrant 
payment of permanent alimony as there were positions available, she could earn 
credits during first year of teaching, and teaching job would square with 
children’s schedule). 
 147. See, e.g., Bhati v. Bhati, 32 So. 3d 1107 (La. Ct. App. 3d 2010) (final 
award of $1000 per month upheld though wife received portion of husband’s 
retirement accounts, former husband was retired, and wife had received master’s 
degree in nursing); Patton v. Patton, 856 So. 2d 56 (La. Ct. App. 2d 2003) (wife 
not precluded from final alimony award as she remained at home during most of 
their 16-year marriage at husband’s insistence and sought and obtained 
employment after separation); see also McCarty v. McCarty, 798 So. 2d 195 
(La. Ct. App. 4th 2001); Brett v. Brett, 794 So. 2d 912 (La. Ct. App. 1st 2001); 
Hammack v. Hammack, 778 So. 2d 70 (La. Ct. App. 1st 2000); Goodnight v. 
Goodnight, 735 So. 2d 809 (La. Ct. App. 3d 1999); Falterman v. Falterman, 726 
So. 2d 1023 (La. Ct. App. 5th 1999); Fountain v. Fountain, 644 So. 2d 733 (La. 
Ct. App. 1st 1994). 
 148. See, e.g., Hindelang v. Hindelang, 49 So. 3d 1065, 1067–68 (La. Ct. 
App. 3d 2010); Dufresne v. Dufresne, 992 So. 2d 579 (La. Ct. App. 5th 2008); 
Earle, 998 So. 2d at 835; Mizell v. Mizell, 942 So. 2d 1191, 1194 (La. Ct. App. 
2d 2006); Ward v. Ward, 894 So. 2d 499 (La. Ct. App. 5th 2005). But see 
Knowles v. Knowles, 827 So. 2d 642 (La. Ct. App. 3d 2002) (standard of living 
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final periodic support award, courts can also take into account any 
substantial assets Esther might receive in her final community 
property settlement or partition and can require her to deplete some 
or all of those assets to provide for her post-divorce support.149 In 
the end, given the ambiguity of the Civil Code and the open-ended 
nature of the discretionary analysis it mandates, courts will still be 
making highly subjective determinations about the actual “ability 
to pay” of a potential payor spouse like Louis and the real “needs” 
of a potential payee spouse like Esther.150 
Even if Esther is fortunate enough to obtain a post-divorce 
alimony award for a stipulated period of time, Stephanie must 
further warn Esther that Louis could return to court and seek a 
modification or even termination at any time if he can show that 
the circumstances of either spouse have materially changed or that 
the award “has become unnecessary.”151 In determining whether a 
“substantial change in circumstances” has occurred, a court would 
again use its substantial discretion to examine all the factors we 
have previously discussed.152 Consequently, if Esther does obtain a 
well-paying job or obtain a master’s degree after the divorce,153 or 
if Louis loses his job or takes a lower paying one,154 it is possible 
that any permanent periodic support award she obtained from 
Louis would be substantially reduced or even terminated. 
Unfortunately, the only thing Esther can really count on in 
terms of alimony is that a permanent award will automatically 
                                                                                                             
 
during the marriage may be considered as a relevant factor); Patton v Patton, 
856 So. 2d 56, 59 (La. Ct. App. 2d 2003) (same); Pierce v. Pierce, 945 So. 2d 
908, 910 (La. Ct. App. 2d 2006) (same). See generally LOWE, supra note 86, § 
8:161, at 814–20 (commenting on contradictory judicial treatment of issue 
regarding the relevance of standard of living during the marriage on final 
periodic support award). 
 149. See, e.g., Wiley v. Wiley, 58 So. 3d 1104, 1108 (La. Ct. App. 3d 2011); 
Loyacano v. Loyacano, 358 So. 2d 304, 311 (La. 1978), rev’d on other grounds, 
375 So. 2d 1314 (La. 1979) (listing factors to be considered in determining 
extent of asset depletion and indicating that determination is “insusceptible of 
solution by any exact formula or monetary index”).  
 150. See LOWE, supra note 86, § 8:161, at 818 (discussing Prestenback v. 
Prestenback, 9 So. 3d 172, 177 (La. Ct. App. 1st 2008)). 
 151. LA. CIV. CODE art. 114 (2011). 
 152. Id. cmt. b. 
 153. See Richard v. Richard, 577 So. 2d 110 (La. Ct. App. 1st 1991) (finding 
the attainment of a college degree in sociology was a substantial change in 
circumstances justifying imputation of earning capacity of social worker to wife 
and thus reduction in alimony pendente lite). 
 154. See Williams v. Poore, 55 So. 3d 953, 959–63 (La. Ct. App. 4th 2011) 
(reducing final periodic alimony award because ex-husband lost his job and ex-
wife’s need was not as great as previously estimated). 
960 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 72 
 
 
 
terminate if she remarries or if either she or Louis dies.155 
Ironically, although neither death nor remarriage is usually subject 
to much dispute, even here there is still some scope for a court to 
engage in contextualized decision making that could well be 
influenced by moral value judgments. The reason, Stephanie would 
explain, is that a Louisiana court can also terminate a periodic 
support award by determining that an “obligee [e.g., someone like 
Esther] has cohabited with another person of either sex in the 
manner of married persons.”156 This cohabitation is “a sexual 
relationship of some permanence regardless of whether the 
cohabitants are prohibited from marrying,” and not “just acts of 
sexual intercourse.”157 So casual sex might not put Esther in any 
jeopardy of losing her permanent alimony award, however modest 
the award might be, but a committed relationship with another man 
or woman would likely bring it to an end.158  
In summary, it seems Esther’s quest for periodic support, if she 
decides to pursue it, will become increasingly influenced by the 
vagaries of judicial discretion as time passes. Initially, her lawyer 
may be able to assure her of at least some interim periodic support, 
subject however to the possibility that a court would impute 
earning capacity to her. But a final periodic support award will be 
a far more uncertain prospect, involving the consideration of 
multiple equitable factors and fluctuating judicial assumptions 
about the proper societal roles of men and women in the family. 
Finally, a permanent alimony award would remain constantly 
                                                                                                             
 155. LA. CIV. CODE art. 115 (2011). 
 156. Id. (emphasis added). 
 157. Id. cmt e. The drafters of revised article 115 apparently worried that ex-
spouses who had entered into same sex relationships might escape the 
consequences of cohabitation. Hence the explanation that cohabitation with a 
person of “either sex” automatically terminates a periodic support award. The 
ex-spouse, however, can always argue that any sexual encounter—heterosexual 
or homosexual—was merely casual sex. Id. 
 158. Indeed, Louisiana courts are not afraid to distinguish between random 
sex and living like a married person and have terminated a handful of support 
awards when the payor spouse discovers the payee has moved in with a 
boyfriend or girlfriend. Compare Short v. Short, 33 So. 3d 988, 956–96 (La. Ct. 
App. 5th 2010) (terminating interim spousal support upon finding that wife was 
engaged in adulterous cohabitation), and Arnold v. Arnold, 843 So. 2d 1167, 
1171 (La. Ct. App. 1st 2003) (terminating wife’s non-rehabilitative spousal 
support award upon finding that wife’s boyfriend had moved in with her), with 
Almon v. Almon, 943 So. 2d 1113, 1117–18 (La. Ct. App. 1st 2006) (random 
acts of sexual intercourse did not extinguish spousal support award); Polk v. 
Polk, 626 So. 2d 1233, 1237–38 (La. Ct. App. 4th 1993) (conception of 
illegitimate child is not, in and of itself, grounds for a finding of open 
concubinage for purposes of terminating permanent periodic alimony award 
under predecessor to current article 115).  
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subject to potential revision or termination based on a court’s 
highly discretionary determination of her continuing need, her 
former spouse’s ability to pay, and the propriety of her personal 
relationships. 
F. Claims for Contribution to Education and Training 
Although most of the issues arising from Esther’s pending 
divorce concern future responsibilities and obligations, Esther is 
likely to have one potential claim grounded firmly in the past. 
Putting aside a community property partition and any periodic 
support claim, Esther is likely to wonder if she is entitled to 
compensation for the financial contributions she made that allowed 
Louis to complete his college degree, obtain his MBA, and 
transform himself from an underpaid sous-chef into a future 
corporate executive. Stephanie will say the answer is yes, at least 
in principle. But the chances of prevailing on such a theory in 
Esther’s case are small. 
Civil Code article 121 authorizes a court to compensate a 
spouse like Esther who has made financial contributions during the 
marriage to the education or training of the other spouse which 
increased that other spouse’s earning power.159 Such award can 
even be granted in addition to a periodic support award or to a 
community property partition award.160 The article was initially 
designed to allow Louisiana courts to avoid the difficult question 
of whether degrees, professional training, or professional licenses 
can be considered marital property for purposes of distribution on 
divorce.161 Despite offering courts some apparent freedom to make 
equitable determinations about entitlement to contribution awards, 
Article 121 has not, however, opened the flood gates to wide-
ranging judicial discretion. 
In general, courts have responded to article 121’s initial grant 
of discretionary authority by delineating several equitable factors 
to consider when these claims are made. These factors include: 
“(1) the claimant’s expectation of shared benefit when the 
                                                                                                             
 159. LA. CIV. CODE art. 121 (2011). This cause of action entered the Civil 
Code as article 161, as enacted by Act 780 of 1986, but is now entrenched in the 
Revised Civil Code. Id. cmt. a. 
 160. Id. 
 161. Id. cmt. f. The leading decision treating degrees and licenses as marital 
property is O’Brien v. O’Brien, 489 N.E.2d 712 (N.Y. 1985). See also Elkus v. 
Elkus, 572 N.Y.S.2d 901 (N.Y. App. Div. 1991) (holding that an opera singer’s 
increased earning potential was attributable to the domestic support and voice 
coaching efforts of her husband and was thus marital property subject to 
equitable distribution upon divorce). 
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contributions were made; (2) the degree of detriment suffered by 
the claimant in making the contributions; and (3) the magnitude of 
the benefit the other spouse received.”162 It would appear these 
factors would require a court to make precisely the kind of 
discriminations of the degree of expectation, harm, and benefit that 
are the hallmark of standard-based decision making. Paradoxically, 
though, courts have often sidestepped such a wide-ranging inquiry. 
They have done so by seizing on the statement in article 121 that a 
contribution claim is allowable only “to the extent that the claimant 
did not benefit during the marriage from the increased earning 
power” of the other spouse,163 and turning that phrase into a kind 
of bright line principle.  
If a claimant spouse like Esther has already been compensated 
by the increased income her spouse earned during the marriage, 
and thus also by increased community property accumulation, a 
claim for contribution to the other spouse’s education and training 
is usually denied.164 Thus, from the clouds of article 121’s 
seemingly broad grant of judicial discretion, a relatively distinct 
rule seems to have emerged. Consequently, unless a separation or 
divorce occurs very soon after the benefited spouse completes his 
study or training (usually within just a few years or less), a claim 
for contribution to education and training will generally not 
succeed.165  
                                                                                                             
 162. Clemons v. Clemons, 960 So. 2d 1068, 1074 (La. Ct. App. 2d 2007); 
Bourgeois v. Bourgeois, 818 So. 2d 1005 (La. Ct. App. 1st 2002). 
 163. LA. CIV. CODE art. 121 (2011). 
 164. It is noteworthy that this cause of action was partially inspired by a 
desire to avoid the conundrum of whether professional degrees or licenses could 
be considered community or martial property subject to partition or distribution 
upon divorce. See LA. CIV. CODE art. 121 cmt. f (2011). Indeed, article 121 
provides that the sum awarded “may be in addition to a sum for support and to 
property received in the partition of community property.” Id. 
 165. In several decisions, courts have struck down claims for contribution on 
just such grounds, thus establishing a presumption that unless the separation or 
divorce occurred very shortly after completion of the defendant spouse’s 
education or specialized training, the supporting spouse benefited from the 
other’s increased income. See Clemons v. Clemons, 960 So. 2d 1068, 1074–75 
(La. Ct. App. 2d 2007) (reversing contribution award because in the six years 
since husband graduated from veterinary school, wife was able to benefit from 
increased income and accumulation of community property); Bourgeois v. 
Bourgeois, 818 So. 2d 1005, 1009–10 (La. Ct. App. 1st 2002) (denying award 
where wife enjoyed three years of increased income after husband graduated 
from law school); cf. Shewbridge v. Shewbridge, 720 So. 2d 780, 782–84 (La. 
Ct. App. 2d 1998) (upholding award when separation occurred a year after the 
husband obtained his commercial pilot’s license); McConathy v. McConathy, 
632 So. 2d 1200, 1205–06 (La. Ct. App. 2d 1994) (upholding award where 
spouses separated during final year of husband’s schooling). 
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Here we find a remedial scheme designed to allow courts to 
peer back into the past and evaluate the degree of one spouse’s 
uncompensated sacrifice for the other spouse. Yet courts have 
proven reluctant to do much of that work and have instead 
retreated to a more mechanical approach that focuses primarily on 
a single factor—the number of years of marriage since the 
completion of the education or training—to decide contribution 
claims. Unfortunately for Esther, given the number of years that 
have passed since she put Louis through college and business 
school, her chances of receiving a post-marital award for her prior 
contributions to Louis’s thriving career are slim. There is certainty 
here for both Esther and Louis, although it will be welcome to only 
one of them.  
G. Child Custody 
Perhaps there is no more contentious and frequently litigated 
matter resulting from a divorce than custody of minor children. 
Consequently, Esther will no doubt ask her lawyer Stephanie for 
advice regarding the custody of Talia and Joshua. Although we 
might have expected that Stephanie could provide only vague and 
uncertain answers given the general reputation of this area of the 
law,166 she can in fact offer several surprisingly definite 
predictions. 
Louisiana Civil Code article 131 appears to constitute the 
paradigmatic example of an open-textured standard. As has always 
been the case in Louisiana, it empowers a Louisiana court to award 
custody in a divorce proceeding “in accordance with the best 
interest of the child.”167 But, in addition to this classic, broad 
                                                                                                             
 166. See Whitty, supra note 7, at 331–332 (noting almost unreviewable 
“welfare of the child” standard for custody determinations in Scotland, but 
observing that rule based decision making has won some acceptance in 
connection with efforts to discourage parental kidnapping for forum-shopping in 
custody litigation). 
 167. LA. CIV. CODE art. 131 (2011). Revised article 131 does not change the 
law, but it simplifies the language used in previous iterations of the Civil Code. 
The drafters of the current version of the article state that the “best interest” 
principle dates back at least as far as 1921, when article 157 of the 1870 Civil 
Code was amended by Acts 1921, First Exec. Sess. No. 38. LA. CIV. CODE art. 
131 cmt. a (2011). In fact, this concept dates back to the earliest Civil Codes of 
Louisiana and to the Code Napoleon, all of which essentially provided that, in 
cases of separation or divorce, children shall be placed under the care of the 
party who obtained the separation or divorce, “unless the judge shall, for the 
greater advantage of the children, and with the advice of the meeting of the 
family, order that some or all of them shall be intrusted to the care of the other 
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standard, the Louisiana Civil Code now provides a powerful 
hierarchy of custodial preferences that will very likely lead 
divorcing parents such as Esther and Louis into a joint custody 
arrangement.168 Furthermore, as we shall see, the Louisiana 
Revised Statues will also structure the contours of this joint 
custody relationship with a surprising amount of precision but will 
then open the door again to substantial judicial discretion should 
the domiciliary parent seek to modify the original arrangement for 
purposes of relocation. 
Unlike the former custodial presumptions in favor of the parent 
obtaining a divorce or in favor of the mother,169 under the Civil 
Code’s new hierarchy of custodial preferences, a court must first 
defer to an agreement of the parents, unless it does not serve the 
best interests of the child.170 In the absence of a parental 
agreement, or if the agreement is not in the child’s best interest, the 
court must award joint custody to both parents.171 Sole custody can 
be granted in favor of a single parent only if “clear and convincing 
evidence” demonstrates this would serve the best interest of the 
child.172 Although a court can in principle award custody to 
someone other than a parent, it can do so only if an award of joint 
custody or sole custody to either parent would result “in substantial 
harm to the child.”173 In short, joint parental custody is now a 
powerful default rule in Louisiana.174 
                                                                                                             
 
party.” LA. CIV. CODE art. 157 (1870); see also LA. CIV. CODE art. 153 (1825); 
Digest of 1808, 34, art. 19; CODE CIVIL art. 302 (Fr.) (1804). 
 168. LA. CIV. CODE art. 132 (2011).  
 169. Under earlier versions of the Civil Code, the party who obtained a 
divorce (someone like Esther perhaps) was presumed to be entitled to custody 
over minor children unless the children would be advantaged by custody in the 
other parent. See LA. CIV. CODE art. 157 (1870), as amended by Act No. 38, 
1921 La. Acts 42, 42, and Act No. 74, 1924 La. Acts 114, 114; LA. CIV. CODE 
art. 153 (1825); Digest of 1808, 34, Art. 19. Formerly, courts also applied a 
“maternal preference rule,” but this presumption, whether based on real life 
experience or fictitious stereotype, has clearly been abrogated. See Hill v. Hill, 
777 So. 2d 1263, 1266 (La. Ct. App. 2d 2001); Dubois v. Dubois, 532 So. 2d 
360 (La. Ct. App. 3d 1988). 
 170. LA. CIV. CODE art. 132 (2011). 
 171. Id. In the words of one leading divorce expert in Louisiana, “joint 
custody is no longer just presumed to be in a child’s best interest, it is mandated 
absent an appropriate parental agreement for another custodial arrangement.” 
LOWE, supra note 86, § 7:31, at 425. 
 172. LA. CIV. CODE art. 132 (2011). 
 173. LA. CIV. CODE art. 133 (2011). This last judicial custody option is 
probably irrelevant to Esther and Louis but is important when both parents 
suffer from drug or alcohol abuse problems or if there are other significant 
threats to the child’s well being from parental custody. See, e.g., Wilson v. Paul, 
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Esther and Louis could, of course, ignore the message this 
codal hierarchy sends and battle each other for sole custody of the 
children. If they did so, a court would be required to consider many 
factors to determine what is in Talia and Joshua’s best interest.175 
But, assuming that Esther and Louis were convinced to save their 
resources and consent to a joint custody award, they would 
probably focus their attention on which parent would be designated 
as the children’s “domiciliary parent.”176  
This domiciliary parent, Stephanie would explain, is the person 
with whom, according to the Louisiana Revised Statutes, the child 
“shall primarily reside,” subject to a number of provisos designed 
to promote, to the greatest extent possible, “frequent and 
continuing contact with both parents,”177 predictability as to the 
time periods for each parent’s physical custody,178 and equal 
sharing of the physical custody.179 Domiciliary parent status is now 
one of the two most important custody battlegrounds because the 
domiciliary parent operates in a real sense as the final decision 
maker for the child, unless an implementation order provides 
otherwise.180 Although the domiciliary parent’s decisions are 
subject to judicial review upon a motion of the non-domiciliary 
parent, the cost of litigating these decisions, and a statutory 
                                                                                                             
 
997 So. 2d 572, 574–75 (La. Ct. App. 3d 2008) (affirming temporary custody 
award to grandparents based on parents’ drug abuse and child’s frequent 
absences from school and stomach aches). 
 174. The inflexible, rule-like structure of this hierarchy was demonstrated in 
a recent appellate decision which held that a non-parent cannot obtain an order 
of joint custody from a court even though the minor child had been living in the 
petitioner’s home since birth along with the child’s biological mother, and even 
though the biological mother consented to the joint custody. In re Melancon, 62 
So. 3d 759 (La. Ct. App. 1st 2010). The petitioning non-parent was not entitled 
to any custody award, the court held, because (1) article 132 of the Civil Code 
only provided for joint custody in favor of “legal parents” and (2) she had not 
made any showing that sole custody in the child’s biological mother was causing 
“substantial harm” as required under article 133 of the Civil Code. Id. at 763–64. 
 175. Indeed, the Civil Code instructs the judge to consider “all relevant 
factors,” including twelve enumerated factors such as the “love, affection and 
other emotional ties between each party and the child,” the capacity of each 
party to give “spiritual guidance” to the child, and perhaps most problematically, 
the “moral fitness” of each party, “insofar as it affects the welfare of the child.” 
LA. CIV. CODE art. 134 (2011). For discussion of the complexities of discerning 
moral fitness, particularly in the context of adulterous relationships engaged in 
by the feuding parents, see LOWE, supra note 86, § 7:42, at 435–36. 
 176. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:335(B)(1) (2008). 
 177. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §. 9:335(B)(2) (2008). 
 178. See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:335(A)(2)(a) (2008). 
 179. See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:335(A)(2)(b) (2008). 
 180. See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:335(B)(3) (2008). 
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presumption that “all major decisions made by the domiciliary 
parent are in the best interest of the child,” will give the 
domiciliary parent effective control over the major choices 
affecting the child’s life.181 In the words of one leading 
commentator, the institution of domiciliary parenthood “effectively 
destroys true joint, legal, custody.”182  
The second crucial and frequently litigated custody issue arises 
when a parent, who is either the “sole or primary custodian” or the 
“domiciliary parent within a joint custody arrangement,”183 desires 
to relocate the child’s principal residence.184 In these situations, 
which can frequently arise when employment demands and 
opportunities change quickly, Louisiana has found it necessary to 
adopt yet another detailed statutory regime in the Civil Code 
ancillaries. That regime provides a presumption in favor of 
maintaining the geographic status quo of the parents and child, but 
it also allows courts to intervene and approve requests to relocate if 
the sole custodian or domiciliary parent proves that a “proposed 
relocation is made in good faith and is in the best interest of the 
child.”185 While the relocation statutes retain the “best interest of 
the child” as the “fundamental principle” governing relocation 
decisions, the Louisiana Supreme Court has emphasized that it was 
the legislature’s intent to assign a very heavy burden to the 
relocating parent in proving that relocation is in the child’s best 
                                                                                                             
 181. Id. 
 182. LOWE, supra note 86, § 7:58, at 443–46. See also id. § 7:59, at 446 
(noting that, if the domiciliary parent’s decision is presumed correct, the right to 
contest it “provides little relief”). But see Bergeron v. Bergeron, 6 So. 3d 948, 
958–959 (La. Ct. App. 2d 2009) (overturning domiciliary parent’s unilateral 
decision to change children’s school, where children were doing well at prior 
school, domiciliary parent failed to show new school would be better and failed 
to consult with father before proposing change). 
 183. See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:355.1(2) (2008) (defining “parent entitled 
to primary custody” for purposes of relocation statutory scheme). 
 184. Either consent of the non-custodial parent or judicial approval is 
required when the custodial parent seeks to establish a legal residence with the 
child: (1) anywhere outside Louisiana; (2) if there is no court order awarding 
custody, somewhere within Louisiana but more than 150 miles from the other 
parent; or (3) if there is a court order awarding custody, somewhere more than 
150 miles from the domicile of the primary custodian at the time the custody 
decree was rendered. See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:355.1(4)(a)–(b) (2008) 
(defining “relocation” for purposes of relocation statutory scheme); see also 
Gray v. Gray, 65 So. 3d 1247, 1255 (La. 2011). 
 185. See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:355.13 (2008) (defining burden of proof 
for relocation proposals). Louisiana based its remedial scheme on a model act 
developed in the 1990s by the American Academy of Matrimonial Lawyers. See 
Curole v. Curole, 828 So. 2d 1094, 1096 (La. 2002). 
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interest.186 Under the statutory scheme, courts are required to 
consider a list of 12 detailed factors that focus not only on the 
quality of the relationship between each parent and the child, but 
also take into account the developmental stage and needs of the 
child, the child’s preference, the quality of life of both the parent 
proposing relocation and the child, including financial or 
emotional benefits and educational opportunities, and of course, 
the employment and economic circumstances of both parents.187  
The frequency of reported decisions addressing relocation 
disputes indicates that this is one of the most commonly litigated 
matters incidental to divorce today. The importance of these 
disputes is also reflected by two 2011 Louisiana Supreme Court 
opinions that sought to fine tune the amount of discretion the 
relocation statutes grant the trial courts. In the first case, the court 
concluded that a trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying 
an ex-wife’s request to relocate minor children to the state of 
Washington.188 In that case, the court held that a trial court is not 
required to expressly analyze each statutory factor in its reasons for 
judgment and, moreover, is free to give whatever weight it deems 
appropriate in a contested relocation dispute.189 In the other case, 
however, the court held that the trial court abused its discretion in 
denying a domiciliary parent’s request to relocate to Kansas and in 
in granting the non-relocating parent’s motion to award her 
domiciliary custody status.190  
So where does this leave Esther and Louis? It appears that if 
they cannot agree on who is going to be the domiciliary parent, a 
court will simply apply the multiple factors set forth in article 134 
of the Civil Code to make a domiciliary parent determination in the 
                                                                                                             
 186. See Curole, 828 So. 2d at 1096–97.  
 187. See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:355.12 (2008), especially § 
9:355.12(A)(1), (2), (4), (6) & (8). 
 188. Gathen v. Gathen, 66 So. 3d 1, 10–13 (La. 2011). 
 189. Id. at 9–10. The court also noted that a “trial court’s failure to expressly 
analyze each factor does not constitute an error of law that would allow de novo 
review.” Id. at 9. 
 190. Gray v. Gray, 65 So. 3d 1247, 1250, 1258, (La. 2011). The complex 
procedural and factual history in Gray demonstrates that relocation disputes are far 
from simple matters. The complexity here arose in part from the fact that the 
father, who was requesting the relocation, had previously obtained an order 
allowing him to relocate to Alabama. The wife was effectively seeking to re-
litigate that earlier order in contesting the proposed relocation to Kansas. Id. at 
1255–56. The Louisiana Supreme Court held that the trial court erred in 
effectively reconsidering the prior decision allowing relocation outside of 
Louisiana. Id. at 1257–58. On the second issue, the court held that Revised 
Statutes section 9:355.11 does not create an exception to the heavy burden of 
proof established in Bergeron v. Bergeron, 492 So. 2d 1193 (La. 1986), for a party 
seeking to modify a considered custody decree. Gray, 65 So. 3d at 1258–60.  
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best interest of the child.191 Later on, if the parent who is 
eventually designated as the domiciliary parent wants to make a 
substantial relocation, that parent will have to convince a court to 
exercise its discretion and find that the relocation will be in the 
child’s best interest. And so, we are back to discretion, 
unavoidably perhaps, but the margin for that discretion has been 
narrowed by special statute and by the Louisiana Supreme Court’s 
emphasis on the relocating parent’s burden of proof.  
Neither Esther nor Louis could probably avoid a joint custody 
award here. They are both responsible, sensible, and caring 
parents. As long as they are each keen on having “substantial” 
amounts of time with Talia and Joshua, a court will most likely 
oblige and grant each parent approximately equal amounts of time 
with the children to the greatest extent possible.192 Thus, the only 
custody issue worth litigating for Esther and Louis is who will be 
the domiciliary parent, a decision that may simply boil down to 
determining with whom the children are residing at the time the 
divorce proceeding begins,193 or which may turn on subtle moral 
judgments of the trial judge.194 
H. Child Support 
We turn at last to the question of whether and to what extent 
either spouse can obtain any financial support from the other 
spouse to take care of the children. At first glance, article 141 of 
the Civil Code seems to promise nothing but unmediated judicial 
discretion on this subject by authorizing a court in a divorce 
proceeding or thereafter to order either one or both of the parents 
to provide an “interim allowance” or “final support” for a child 
                                                                                                             
 191. See Porter v. Porter, 74 So. 3d 305, 307 (La. Ct. App. 3d 2011) 
(applying article 134 factors to review domiciliary parent determination); Hill v. 
Hill, 777 So. 2d 1263, 1266–68 (La. Ct. App. 2d 2001) (same); Winzor v. 
Winzor, 856 So. 2d 107, 111–15 (La. Ct. App. 3d 2003) (applying an article 134 
best interest analysis to determine if a material change in circumstances had 
occurred, sufficient to warrant a proposed change in domiciliary parent 
designation from a prior consent judgment on custody).  
 192. See Barrios v. Barrios, 32 So. 3d 324, 327–28 (La. Ct. App. 2d 2010) 
(observing that in determining precise contours of joint custody award as to time 
splitting, court is not required to make a mechanical evaluation of statutory 
factors under article 134; “substantial time, rather than strict equality of time, is 
the objective of joint custody”). 
 193. See Snowton v. Snowton, 22 So. 3d 1111, 1113 (La. Ct. App. 4th 2009). 
 194. See Porter, 74 So. 3d at 307–08 (affirming trial court’s award of 
domiciliary parent status to mother in light of father’s admission of watching 
pornography and in spite of mother’s alleged extra-marital relationships and 
friendships with lesbians). 
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based “on the needs of the child and the ability of the parents to 
provide support.”195 This discretion is seemingly amplified by 
article 142, which allows courts to modify or terminate a child 
support award if the circumstances of the child or either parent 
materially change.196 But once again, and to an even greater extent 
than with domiciliary parenthood or relocation disputes, this 
judicial discretion is just the tip of the iceberg. In fact, lurking not 
far below the surface is a vast, sub-codal, minutely-detailed regime 
of statutory guidelines regulating child support awards that courts 
are obligated to apply in an essentially mechanistic fashion.197  
This tightly restricted regime for determination and 
enforcement of child support payments, initially enacted in 1989 in 
response to a federal statute, was comprehensively updated in 
2001.198 Its core provision, Revised Statutes section 9:315, 
contains 47 sub-parts,199 detailed schedules for the determination 
of the basic child support obligation,200 and detailed obligation 
worksheets that resemble IRS income tax forms.201 Under the 
guidelines, a court’s determination of a child support award is 
based on a calculation of both parents’ combined gross income, an 
economic estimate of how much an intact family with the same 
income and the same number of children would spend on child 
rearing expenditures, and a pro-ration of these expenditures 
according to each parent’s income.202 The court then takes into 
account shared or split custodial arrangements and voluntary 
unemployment and underemployment.203  
                                                                                                             
 195. LA. CIV. CODE art. 141 (2011). 
 196. LA. CIV. CODE art. 142 (2011). 
 197. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 9:312, 313 and 315–315.47 (2008 and Supp. 
2011).  
 198. See Act No. 9 (2d Ext. Sess.), 1989 La. Acts 2563 (enacting LA. REV. 
STAT. §§ 9:315–315.15 in response to the Family Support Act of 1988, Pub. L. 
No. 100-485, 102 Stat. 2343 (1988) (codified as 42 U.S.C. 667(b))); Act No. 
1082, 2001 La. Acts 2264 (enacting amended LA. REV. STAT. §§ 9:315–315.22 
(2002)). For overviews of the process of enacting and amending Louisiana’s 
child support guidelines based on an income shares model, see Sue Nations, 
Louisiana’s Child Support Guidelines: A Preliminary Analysis, 50 LA. L. REV. 
1057, 1058–59 (1990); Katherine Shaw Spaht, The Two “ICS” of the 2001 
Louisiana Child Support Guidelines: Economics and Politics, 62 LA. L. REV. 
709, 712–15 (2002). 
 199. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 9: 315.1–315.47 (Supp. 2011). 
 200. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9: 315.19 (Supp. 2011). 
 201. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9: 315.20 (2008). 
 202. Spaht, supra note 198, at 717–18 (explaining how an income shares 
child support model works in general); see also LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 
9:315.2, 315.3, 315.8 and 315.19–20 (2008 and Supp. 2011) (conforming with 
Spaht’s explanation). 
 203. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 9: 315.9–11 (2008). 
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In effect, this statutory scheme amounts to an entire child 
support code providing a highly detailed, “rule-like” administrative 
framework for establishing and enforcing child support obligations 
among divorced parents.204 Previously Louisiana courts fashioning 
a child support award were “free to consider the totality of the 
circumstances presented in every case” and a trial court’s decision 
could be overturned on appeal only for abuse of discretion.205 
Today, however, a child support calculation produced by 
application of the guidelines is presumed to be correct.206 
Moreover, a trial court that wants to deviate from an award amount 
“that would have been required under a mechanical application of 
the guidelines” is required to make specific findings and provide 
specific reasons on the record to justify why the deviation is “in the 
best interest of the child” or would not be inequitable to the 
parties.207 In short, the tables have been overturned. Discretion 
appears to be disfavored under the new child support guidelines. 
This does not mean, however, that all child support issues are 
solved merely by plugging numbers into a spread sheet. Some of 
the most difficult issues that arise in the context of periodic 
alimony disputes are reprised here—for instance, the problem of 
whether and to what extent a court should attribute earning 
potential to a spouse who is not currently working.208 But even on 
this issue, the child support guidelines offer a more definitive, 
hard-edged solution than the Civil Code does in the context of 
alimony. The child support guidelines specify that the imputation 
of earning potential to a non-working spouse is required for a child 
support calculation unless: the non-working spouse is involuntarily 
unemployed or underemployed, absolutely unemployable or 
                                                                                                             
 204. Of course, important social and economic assumptions and values 
undergird many of the detailed provisions of the guidelines, but debate about 
these assumptions and values are now channeled into the legislative rather than 
the judicial process. See generally Spaht, supra note 198, at 716–62 (providing a 
detailed critique of the 2001 revision of the child support guidelines as being too 
adult focused and not sufficiently child centered). 
 205. LA. CIV. CODE art. 141 cmt. d (2011).  
 206. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:315.1(A) (Supp. 2011). 
 207. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:315.1(B) (Supp. 2011). See also LA. CIV. 
CODE art. 141 cmt. d (2011).  
 208. See generally LA. CIV. CODE art. 141 cmt. f (2011) (explaining that 
certain provisions of the guidelines provide that “unemployment or 
underemployment of a parent will not diminish his portion of the parents’ total 
child support obligation below that which would be dictated by his ‘potential 
income,’ except in specified circumstances”). 
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incapable of being employed, or caring for a child under the age of 
five.209  
What accounts for this general turn away from judicial 
discretion and toward mechanistic rules in the child support arena? 
As noted above, the demands of the United States Congress is one 
simple explanation. Another may be lawmakers’ concern that all 
the parties involved in a child support dispute will benefit by as 
much certainty and predictability as the legal regime can muster 
and a concomitant concern that even modest amounts of judicial 
discretion in this particular arena would allow judges to fashion 
awards that would be too susceptible to emotion, personal biases, 
and other irrelevant data. A final factor may be the recognition that 
the interest of the most innocent party—the child—should not 
depend on the advantage that a wealthier potential obligor spouse 
could gain by simply hiring a better lawyer.  
I. A Final Marriage and Divorce Accounting 
Having worked our way through nearly all the legal issues that 
would confront Esther and Louis as a result of their looming 
divorce, we must now ask whether Esther should feel discouraged 
or uplifted by her lawyer’s report on the seemingly broad, 
discretion-inviting standards pronounced in the Louisiana Civil 
Code and the curious way that these standards have been modified, 
supplemented, and even cabined by judicial presumptions 
emerging in the case law and by the mechanistic regimes appearing 
in the revised statutes. So, let us take a final accounting. 
Recall that we began with two notes of certainty. First, we saw 
that the Civil Code’s legal directives governing the formation of a 
marriage are both rule-like and permissible.210 We then observed 
that the Louisiana Civil Code’s provisions on community property 
are generally crystalline in form and allow a lawyer to calculate 
which assets and funds acquired by a couple during their marriage 
will be community and separate property with relative ease.211 
Thus, a couple like Esther and Louis should, by opting for an 
                                                                                                             
 209. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 9:315(C)(5)(b), 315.11(A) (Supp. 2011); see 
e.g., Kairdolf v. Kairdolf, 58 So. 3d 527, 530–532 (La. Ct. App. 2d 2011) 
(applying cited guidelines and holding that the trial court did not err in finding 
that the father, who had lost job as computer engineer for which he earned 
$6,666 per month and who had acquired a new job for which he earned $2,916 
per month, was “voluntarily underemployed as a result of his fault or neglect” 
and was therefore required to pay child support based on his previous, higher 
imputed income). 
 210. See supra notes 68–77 and accompanying text. 
 211. See supra notes 89–104 and accompanying text. 
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extra-judicial partition, be able to avoid the risk and uncertainty of 
a community property partition in the hands of a judge who could 
wield the considerable discretion vested in him by Louisiana 
Revised Statutes section 9:2801 and its aggregate theory of 
partition.212 We also noted that judicial innovation in the form of 
case law establishing equitable approaches to the problem of 
partitioning pension and retirement benefits was perhaps an 
unavoidable and largely salutary development.213 
Next we saw that the likelihood of Esther obtaining any kind of 
periodic alimony award—whether it be an interim award or a final 
award—is undoubtedly subject to more judicial discretion. But 
here the pattern of Louisiana judicial decisions suggest that such an 
award is likely to provide her with no more than a few years of a 
partial income subsidy while she goes back to graduate school or 
looks for a job and that such an award is probably going to take 
into account her potential earning capacity, despite her absence 
from the work force for many years.214 We also discovered Esther 
is almost certainly not going to be compensated for contributing to 
Louis’s education and training given the significant amount of time 
that elapsed during the marriage since Louis completed his 
studies.215 In short, judicial discretion in both of these areas is not 
as great as it first seems because of subsequent jurisprudential 
development.  
Finally, we realized that Esther and Louis will, in all 
likelihood, face even less judicial discretion and less room for 
maneuver in resolving matters relating to their children. A joint 
custody award in their case is almost a certainty. Esther may well 
become the domiciliary parent if for no other reason than that the 
children are residing with her at the time the divorce proceeding 
gets under way, as long as Louis cannot prove that she is unfit to 
have domiciliary custody status.216 Should Esther decide she wants 
to relocate with the children without Louis’s blessing, she will face 
a difficult, uphill battle in convincing a court that such a move 
would be in the children’s best interest.217 Esther will almost 
certainly be entitled to a child support award from Louis. This will 
be determined mechanistically by the child support guidelines that 
take into account her ability to work, her current modest income 
                                                                                                             
 212. See supra notes 119–129 and accompanying text. 
 213. See supra notes 130–134 and accompanying text. 
 214. See supra notes 135–158 and accompanying text. 
 215. See supra notes 159–165 and accompanying text. 
 216. See supra notes 167–182, 192–194 and accompanying text.  
 217. See supra notes 183–191 and accompanying text 
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earning potential, and Louis’s currently much larger income 
earning potential.218  
In sum, there are two overriding patterns. On one hand, with 
community property and community property partition, we see 
clear, categorical rules modified by a legislatively-created, 
specialized forum for judicial discretion and by a jurisprudentially-
created avenue of discretion for the division of the most complex 
kinds of marital assets. On the other hand, with alimony, claims for 
contribution, child custody, and child support, we find broad grants 
of discretion in the Civil Code, modified by certainty-enhancing 
judicial presumptions and mechanical, rule-setting regimes 
established outside the Civil Code. In short, a kind of blurring has 
occurred. In this crucial legal sphere governing the creation and 
termination of marriage, we find neither the swamp of 
discretionary standards some fear, nor a dominion of rules. Instead, 
we find a blend of both forms of legal directives intermingling in a 
rough equipoise. 
III. BOOK TWO: CO-OWNERSHIP AMONG UNMARRIED CO-
HABITANTS 
Fourteen years have passed since Esther and Louis’s divorce. 
Eventually Esther went back to school, earned a master’s degree 
in counseling and found a job she loves, working as a high school 
guidance counselor. Meanwhile Louis rose to vice-president of 
marketing at Green Earth, but eventually grew tired of the 
corporate grind. Five years ago, he resigned from the company 
and opened his own consulting firm advising food producers on 
how to certify and market their organic products. Talia and Joshua 
graduated from high school, then college, and eventually found 
jobs of their own. Esther and Louis attended the graduation 
ceremonies together and treated each other kindly in the glow of 
their children’s achievements.  
One evening, about a year ago, Esther and Louis ran into each 
other at a party hosted by a mutual friend. After talking for an 
hour, they were both struck by how much they still had in common. 
Louis asked Esther out for dinner the following night. They went to 
one of their old, favorite restaurants in the Bywater and then 
walked to Frenchman Street for a drink. They began to date 
regularly and soon realized they wanted to be together all the time. 
Yet, chastened by their past experience, neither Esther nor Louis 
was eager to get married again.  
                                                                                                             
 218. See supra notes 195–209 and accompanying text. 
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After a year of shuttling back and forth between their 
respective homes, Esther and Louis decided to sell their own 
houses and buy a house together. They agreed that each would 
contribute one-half of the down payment and each would be 
responsible for one-half of the mortgage note, property taxes, 
insurance, utilities, and regular maintenance expenses. They found 
a renovated double shotgun back in their old Bywater 
neighborhood and purchased it together.  
Under Louisiana law, Esther and Louis are hardly unique. 
Having become co-owners of the Bywater house, they have 
entered into a form of property ownership known as “ownership in 
indivision.”219 Other than community property for married couples, 
it is the only form of concurrent ownership allowed in 
Louisiana.220 This property relationship will be governed by a 
largely transparent cluster of just 21 articles found in Title 7 of 
Book II of the Civil Code. These legal directives are among the 
most commonly applied yet underappreciated articles in the Civil 
Code. Although these articles provide the foundation for the 
property relationships of countless Louisiana property owners, they 
are consciously understood by few.  
Why is co-ownership law so omnipresent? First, many people 
just like Esther and Louis will voluntarily choose to acquire 
property together as friends, business partners,221 or unmarried 
cohabitants.222 Indeed, for same sex couples in Louisiana, 
ownership in indivision is the only way to structure a legal 
relationship of shared property ownership,223 other than through 
entity forms of property management such as partnerships, trusts, 
limited liability companies, or corporations.224 Another large and 
growing category of co-owners in Louisiana are formerly married 
individuals who continue to own their former community property 
                                                                                                             
 219. LA. CIV. CODE art. 797 (2011). 
 220. Id. cmts. b & d. 
 221. See, e.g., Bruscato v. Oswalty 975 So. 2d 120 (La. Ct. App. 2d 2008) 
(applying co-ownership principles to deal with arrangements among attorneys 
who co-owned office building). 
 222. According to the U.S. Census Bureau, there has been a 97% increase in 
the number of unmarried cohabitating couples living in the United States 
between 2000 and 2010. HARPER’S MAGAZINE, Aug. 2011, at 13, 72.  
 223. Recall that persons of the same sex may not contract marriage in 
Louisiana. LA. CIV. CODE art. 89 (2011). Consequently, they are barred from 
entering into community property regimes. LA. CIV. CODE art. 2325 (2011). 
 224. See THOMAS W. MERRILL & HENRY E. SMITH, PROPERTY: PRINCIPLES 
AND POLICIES, 684–85, 801–04, 826–29 (2007) (explaining how various forms 
of entity ownership allow for specialization of management functions for a 
complex asset or multiple assets for a number of possessory or non-possessory 
interest holders). 
2012] LOVE, LOYALTY AND THE LOUISIANA CIVIL CODE 975 
 
 
 
together for extensive periods of time after divorce. These couples 
never bother to complete a community property partition or they 
simply agree to remain as co-owners.225 Finally, and perhaps most 
common of all, many individuals become co-owners more or less 
involuntarily as a result of the operation of Louisiana’s intestate 
succession laws or because they are the recipient of a donation 
inter vivos or mortis causa. Even though they may be siblings, 
relatives, or close friends, such people find themselves thrust into 
co-ownership relationships that they might not have chosen on 
their own.226 
If Esther and Louis live happily ever after in their Bywater 
home, their co-ownership relationship may never require them to 
consult a lawyer. This is possible because in many ways 
Louisiana’s legal directives on co-ownership mirror the rules most 
co-owners would intuitively imagine apply to their relationship. 
For instance, both Louis and Esther each have a right to use and 
occupy the object of their co-ownership (the house) “according to 
its previous destination” (that is, in the way it has historically been 
used) and neither can prevent the other from continuing that use.227 
In other words, each of them would have an “equal and correlative 
right” to personally occupy and use every square foot of their co-
owned house in ways consistent with its previous use, without 
regard to the extent of each other’s fractional ownership.228 As a 
corollary matter, if Esther and Louis ever begin to quarrel, neither 
                                                                                                             
 225. See LA. CIV. CODE art. 2369.1 (2011) (providing generally for 
application of co-ownership articles after termination of community property 
regime for reason other than death); LA. CIV. CODE arts. 2369.2–.8 (2011) 
(providing more detailed rules for post-community property co-ownership up to 
and including partition); see, e.g., Sullivan v. Wallace, 51 So. 3d 702 (La. 2010) 
(addressing claims of timber privacy between former married couple who, after 
their divorce, continued to own a 120 acre tract of timberland as co-owners); 
Westcott v. Westcott, 11 So. 3d 45 (La. App. 4th 2009) (husband and wife each 
entitled to one-half of insurance proceeds arising from flood damage pending 
post-divorce partition of community property). 
 226. Strictly speaking, an heir, legatee, or donee can always refuse to accept 
such a devise, bequest, or gift, so the entrance into a co-ownership relationship 
is voluntary in a formal sense. See, e.g., LA. CIV. CODE art. 947 (2011) (“A 
successor is not obligated to accept rights to succeed. He may accept some of 
those rights and renounce others.”); LA. CIV. CODE art. 1544 (2011) (“A 
donation inter vivos is without effect until it is accepted by the donee.”). But, of 
course, most people do not look a gift horse in the mouth and thus find 
themselves more or less involuntarily sharing property with others in these 
situations. 
 227. LA. CIV. CODE art. 802 (2011). 
 228. Thomas Harrell, Problems Created by Co-ownership in Louisiana, 32 
INST. MIN. L. 381, 386 (1985); Symeon C. Symeonides & Nicole Duarte Martin, 
The New Law of Co-Ownership: A Komentar, 68 TUL. L. REV. 69, 126 (1993). 
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one could block the other’s use of any portion of the house, let 
alone the whole house, by locking a door or creating some other 
obstruction to use without making himself or herself liable for rent 
to the other.229  
In addition to this basic individual right of co-extensive use, 
each co-owner will also be entitled to share in the fruits and 
products of the thing held in indivision (such as rental income if 
Esther and Louis leased the house to a tenant) in proportion to a 
co-owner’s ownership, subject to deduction for external costs of 
production incurred by one co-owner alone.230 Similarly and 
crucially, each co-owner will also have the right to terminate the 
co-ownership relationship and demand a partition of the co-owned 
asset at any time, unless the co-owners have contractually agreed 
not to partition the asset.231 This clear, imprescriptible right to 
demand partition232—the right to exit from a co-ownership 
relationship on demand—is essential because it should in theory, 
and without the need for costly judicial intervention, curb abusive 
or opportunistic behavior among co-owners and instill in them 
habits of cooperation and mutual regard.233 
A co-ownership relationship between individuals like Esther 
and Louis is most likely to become problematic and litigious when 
the personal circumstances of one or more of the co-owners change 
(as in the case of a serious illness or indebtedness of a co-owner), 
or there is a change in the surrounding circumstances (such as a 
                                                                                                             
 229. See Von Drake v. Rogers, 996 So. 2d 608, 610 (La. Ct. App. 2d 2008) 
(a co-owner in exclusive possession of a thing held in indivsion may be liable 
for rent to another co-owner but beginning only on the date another co-owner 
has demanded occupancy and been refused); see also Symmeonides & Martin, 
supra note 228, at 126–27 (discussing circumstances in which a co-owner may 
be liable for rent for exclusive occupancy). The Louisiana Supreme Court has 
also applied this same rule in the context of former spouses when one ex-spouse 
obtains exclusive occupancy of the former community property family home 
prior to a community property partition. McCarroll v. McCarroll, 701 So. 2d 
1280, 1290 (La. 1997). Special legislation also disallows rent liability for use 
and occupancy in this context, with some limited exceptions. LA. REV. STAT. 
ANN. § 9:374(C) (Supp. 2011). 
 230. LA. CIV. CODE art. 798 (2011). A co-owner who contributes his own 
labor or services to the production of fruits or products is not entitled to claim 
compensation under the law of co-ownership but may be entitled to 
compensation under the law of unjust enrichment. Id. cmt. c. 
 231. LA. CIV. CODE art. 807 (2011). An agreement between co-owners 
excluding partition cannot last more than 15 years. Id. 
 232. LA. CIV. CODE art. 817 (2011). The only non-contractual limit on a co-
owner’s exit right is that “[p]artition of a thing held in indivision is excluded 
when its use is indispensible for the enjoyment of another thing owned by one or 
more of the co-owners.” LA. CIV. CODE art. 808 (2011).  
 233. See generally Dagan & Heller, supra note 114. 
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flood of the home), but a consensus among the co-owners on how 
to respond to either kind of change proves elusive. Disputes and 
litigation are likely to arise in these situations precisely because the 
Civil Code provides an essentially mechanistic set of rules that 
almost always requires unanimity of all co-owners before any 
significant change in the co-owned property can occur. For 
instance, when one of the co-owners wants to make a substantial 
physical alteration or improvement to the co-owned property, 
unanimous consent of all the co-owners is required.234 Unanimity 
is also required to put the property to any significantly new kind of 
use, even if this would not entail a substantial, physical alteration 
or improvement to the property, because any significant use and 
management decision also requires unanimous consent.235 Finally, 
to alienate, lease or encumber the entirety of the property (as 
opposed to his undivided share),236 unanimous consent will again 
be required.  
This rigid requirement of unanimity can become a particularly 
onerous obstacle to co-owners’ ability to adapt to quickly changing 
circumstances when the number of co-owners multiplies (as where 
original co-owners have transferred their undivided interests in 
their co-owned home to multiple persons through donations or 
legacies).237 No matter how many co-owners are involved, and no 
matter how large a majority of them would like to see some change 
take place, a majority preference will not suffice to override a 
single co-owner who wishes to continue using the property 
according to its prior destination or who withholds his consent to a 
proposed change of use or a proposed substantial alteration or 
                                                                                                             
 234. LA. CIV. CODE art. 804 (2011).  
 235. LA. CIV. CODE art. 801 (2011). This interpretation of article 801 
depends on reading it in pari materia with article 802’s statement that “[e]xcept 
as otherwise provided in Article 801, a co-owner is entitled to use the thing held 
in indivision according to its destination . . .” LA. CIV. CODE art. 802 (2011) 
(emphasis added). See also Symeonides & Martin, supra note 228, at 117–19, 
124–25 (linking articles 801 and 802 for purposes of applying the unanimity 
principle to acts of use and management other than those  consistent with the 
destination of the property and acts of conservation).  Imagine, for example, if a 
co-owner of a house sought to change its use from owner occupancy to a rental 
unit or a bed and breakfast. He would need his fellow co-owners’ unanimous 
consent even if no physical alterations were required. 
 236. LA. CIV. CODE art. 805 (2011). See also Bruscato v. Oswalt, 975 So. 2d 
120, 125 (La. Ct. App. 2d 2008) (recognizing subtle distinction between leasing 
an entire co-owned thing and one co-owner’s share in indivision in context of 
dispute over payment of monthly fee paid by one attorney to another attorney 
who co-owned a building with a third attorney). 
 237. See, e.g., Succession of Miller, 674 So. 2d 441 (La. Ct. App. 4th 1996). 
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improvement of the co-owned property.238 As a result, Louisiana 
judges will generally not intervene in the affairs of unhappy co-
owners and choose among competing use, development, or 
management plans for a co-owned asset.239 In short, Esther and 
Louis must remember that co-ownership of the house does not 
produce a democracy. It does not even create a fiduciary duty of 
the type found in a partnership or trust.240 Relying on the lucid 
commands we have just discussed, courts have generally kept a 
safe distance from most internal co-ownership disputes. 
This is not to say that judicial discretion and open-textured 
standards are totally foreign to the law of co-ownership. Putting 
aside the issue of the scope of the standard of care that one co-
owner generally owes to another co-owner regarding a co-owned 
asset,241 in three relatively narrow categories of co-ownership 
disputes, openings for judicial discretion—or at least more scope 
for judicial weighing, balancing and fact finding—have appeared 
in recent years.  
                                                                                                             
 238. Butler v. Hensley, 332 So. 2d 315, 318 (La. Ct. App. 4th 1976) (on 
rehearing) (majority of co-owners not entitled to block co-owner with very small 
fractional share from using property for purposes of living in a mobile home); 
see also Harper v. O’Neal, 363 So. 2d 930, 932 (La. Ct. App. 2d 1978) (holding 
that a co-owner who plowed up the other co-owner’s sweet potato crop on 
portion of farm owned in indivision was liable for damages because planting 
sweet potato crop was consistent with proper use of the land); Stinson v. 
Martson, 169 So. 436, 439 (La. 1936) (one co-owner cannot enjoin another co-
owner of plantation from cultivating it for production of crops ordinarily raised 
there). 
 239. Harrell, supra note 228, at 386–88. 
 240. Id. at 384 (noting that co-owners do not owe each other fiduciary duties 
to act in each other’s best interest); see also Symmeonides & Martin, supra note 
228, at 119–21 (also distinguishing unanimity rule required for use and 
management decisions in co-ownership from more relaxed management rules 
for partnerships and spouses). 
 241. See LA. CIV. CODE art. 799 (2011) (specifying that a “co-owner is liable 
to his co-owner for any damage to the thing held in indivision caused by his 
fault”) (emphasis added); see also Symmeonides & Martin, supra note 228, at 
101–12 (explaining that the standard of care imposed by article 709 is a 
“prudent man” standard falling somewhere between the high, fiduciary standard 
imposed under partnership law and the low, “fraud or bad faith” standard 
imposed on spouses dealing with community property, but still somewhat more 
lax than the “prudent administrator” standard imposed on usufructuaries); 
Lococo v. Lococo, 462 So. 2d 893, 895 (La. Ct. App. 4th 1984) (recognizing 
that a co-owner may be liable as a negotiorum gestor for a failure to maintain 
and preserve property under his management and control). 
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The first opening has arisen in the arena of what some civilian 
scholars have called “conservatory acts.”242 Although the Civil 
Code generally requires unanimous consent for any significant 
alterations or improvements to co-owned property, it also 
authorizes an individual co-owner to act unilaterally if he is 
engaging in “necessary steps for the preservation of the thing that 
is held in indivision.”243 As an incident of this unilateral right to 
engage in conservatory actions, a co-owner who “has incurred 
necessary expenses, expenses for ordinary maintenance and 
repairs, or necessary management expenses paid to a third person” 
can obtain reimbursement from his fellow co-owner.244 Conflict is 
inevitable, however, if one co-owner (for example Louis) is 
prepared to organize a significant conservatory action that he 
believes is crucial to preserving the property (perhaps putting a 
new roof on the house), but his fellow co-owners (Esther or her 
heirs) do not believe the action is really necessary. In this situation, 
the active co-owner would bear the risk of absorbing the full cost 
of the conservatory action if it is successfully challenged by the 
passive co-owner in court.245 
It was precisely this kind of situation that motivated a 
Louisiana appellate court to hold recently that one co-owner can 
file a declaratory judgment action for the purpose of obtaining an 
advance judicial determination as to whether a significant proposed 
conservatory action—in this case the construction of a levee 
around coastal property—is in fact a “necessary expense” under 
article 806 and thus subject to mandatory cost-sharing.246 
Somewhat surprisingly given the tendency of previous Louisiana 
courts to shy away from co-ownership management disputes, a 
majority of the judges on this appellate court panel accepted this 
judicial oversight authority and went so far as to set forth several 
factors to be considered in resolving disputes of this nature.247  
                                                                                                             
 242. Symmeonides & Martin, supra note 228, at 113 (citing A.N. 
YIANNOPOULOS, PERSONAL SERVITUDES §3, at 6, in 3 LOUISIANA CIVIL LAW 
TREATISE (3d ed. 1989)). 
 243. LA. CIV. CODE art. 800 (2011). 
 244. LA. CIV. CODE art. 806 (2011). 
 245. Such an expenditure could be deemed a mere “luxury” or even “useful,” 
but still not be “necessary” for purposes of obtaining reimbursement under 
article 806. See Symmeonides & Martin, supra note 228, at 148 (commenting on 
the cross-reference in the official comment to article 806 to article 527’s 
distinction between “necessary,” “useful,” and “luxurious” expenses). 
 246. Miller v. Seven C’s Properties, LLC, 800 So. 2d 406, 408–10 (La. Ct. 
App. 3d 2001). 
 247. Id. at 411 (suggesting that courts consider “the present condition of the 
property, the type and extent, including the cost, of the proposed repairs, and the 
benefits to be derived therefrom”). 
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An even narrower occasion for judicial discretion can arise 
when the use and management of a thing held in indivision is not 
determined by a co-ownership agreement and partition is not 
otherwise available. In this situation, article 803 of the Civil Code 
allows a co-owner to petition a court to determine the use and 
management of the co-owned thing.248 In one case, a court 
exercised this authority to approve a proposed use and 
management plan providing for limited access to a grand New 
Orleans home because the co-owners had already commenced the 
process of partitioning the home by private sale and therefore it 
was, according to the court, not subject to partition.249 In essence, 
the court interpreted article 803’s requirement of partition 
unavailability flexibly, and not at all unreasonably, to avoid the 
risk of deterioration of a valuable co-owned asset that was already 
in the process of being partitioned in the most economically 
advantageous manner possible.250 
The third potential site for judicial discretion in co-ownership 
arises when co-owners are parting ways and cannot agree on the 
precise method of partitioning their property—that is, on whether 
the partition should be in kind (an actual physical division of the 
asset) or by licitation (private sale). The Civil Code’s basic 
provision here is that a court “shall decree partition in kind when 
the thing held in indivision is susceptible to division into as many 
lots of nearly equal value as there are shares and the aggregate 
value of all lots is not significantly lower than the value of the 
property in the state of indivision.”251 Although this directive 
seems to call for some discretionary and subjective judgments 
about the size and value of lots and seems to favor partition in 
kind, it has given rise to a rule-like line of judicial decisions which 
sanction partition by licitation in almost all partition disputes 
except those which might involve large and essentially uniform 
tracts of rural land—a situation that simply does not arise 
frequently given the complex geography of Louisiana.252 In other 
                                                                                                             
 248. LA. CIV. CODE art. 803 (2011). 
 249. Succession of Miller, 674 So. 2d 441, 444 (La. Ct. App. 4th 1996),  
 250. In this case, there was some evidence that the co-owner resisting the 
judicially authorized use and management plan wanted to exercise his right of 
co-extensive use of the co-owned house and its furnishings under article 802 in 
ways that might jeopardize the interests of his fellow co-owners. Id. at 442–43. 
 251. LA. CIV. CODE art. 810 (2011). 
 252. See, e.g., Ark-La-Miss Timber Co. v. Wilkins, 833 So. 2d 1154 (La. Ct. 
App. 2d 2002) (ordering partition by licitation of large timberland tract); Entrada 
Co. v. Unopened Succession, 882 So. 2d 661, 663–65 (La. Ct. App. 2d 2004) 
(same); Lasseigne v. Baker, 924 So. 2d 1074, 1076–78 (La. Ct. App. 5th 2006) 
(ordering partition by licitation of small canal side parcel). 
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words, the potential for judicial discretion in partition disputes has 
effectively and paradoxically been erased by judicial decree. 
A Co-Ownership Final Accounting: Other than the three 
limited and narrow occasions for judicial discretion discussed 
above, the law of co-ownership remains dominated by general, but 
nevertheless clear, rights-based rules capable of relatively 
mechanistic application in the event of a co-ownership dispute. 
Thus, co-owners like Esther and Louis who voluntarily embark 
upon a co-ownership relationship together will rarely need to 
consult lawyers, and, if they do, their consultations will usually be 
brief. Each co-owner enjoys a unilateral right to equal and co-
extensive use and occupancy of their co-owned property according 
to its previous destination and essentially equal rights to share in 
its fruits and revenues. Almost all of their other dealings with co-
owned property, with a few notable but narrow exceptions, remain 
subject to the requirement of unanimous decision making and 
backstopped by an essentially imprescriptible and unwaivable right 
to demand partition. 
If more co-owners are brought into their relationship through 
succession, gift, or legacy, there is certainly a greater chance for 
conflict. Yet, unless those conflicts concern the authority to 
conduct allegedly necessary repairs, management plans pending 
partition, or methods of partition, the conflicts will still be 
governed, by rather inflexible rules. Although this rights-based, 
rule-oriented framework can work well for a couple like Esther and 
Louis who have freely and voluntarily entered into ownership-in-
indivision, it can prove to be especially rigid for larger collections 
of co-owners who confront rapidly changing circumstances. Here, 
the very inflexibility of Louisiana’s co-ownership regime may 
reflect a core policy commitment of the Civil Code—to encourage 
parties who find themselves in unwieldy co-ownership regimes to 
partition the property. 
IV. BOOK THREE: FROM FORCED HEIRSHIP TO UNDUE INFLUENCE  
Let’s move forward in time and make some new assumptions. 
Eventually Esther and Louis’s relationship experienced yet 
another rough patch. They separated and partitioned their co-
owned house in New Orleans.  
Two years ago Louis married another woman named Julia. 
Julia has been a painter and art teacher most of her life. She has 
two children from her own previous marriage to a local architect.  
About a year into their new marriage, Julia suggested that 
Louis update his will. Julia put Louis in contact with her own 
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attorney who advised Louis. The attorney wrote a new will for him, 
which Louis promptly executed. 
Under this new will, Louis left specific legacies of $300,000 
each to Talia and Joshua, his children from his marriage to 
Esther. But he made Julia his residuary legatee. In other words, 
everything else in Louis’s substantial patrimony would belong to 
Julia upon his death. 
Three months later, Louis was diagnosed with advanced colon 
cancer. The doctors tried chemotherapy and radiation, but nothing 
worked. Within a year, Louis passed away. 
When Talia and Joshua were informed of their legacies under 
Louis’s will, they were initially quite surprised. They had always 
assumed they would receive most of their father’s estate. When 
they realized the vast bulk of their father’s $4,000,000 estate would 
belong to Julia, their surprise turned to anger.  
Talia and Joshua went to see their mother, Esther. Esther 
promptly set up an appointment with her old friend and former 
divorce attorney, Stephanie. When they arrived at Stephanie’s 
office, they explained what had happened and asked Stephanie 
what could be done. 
Stephanie’s first task will be to explain that Louis was entirely 
within his rights to leave almost all of his estate to Julia. The 
reason, Stephanie would explain, is that Talia and Joshua are both 
able bodied, mentally competent, and older than 23 years of age. 
Therefore, neither child is considered a “forced heir” in 
Louisiana,253 and consequently neither has any immediate legal 
entitlement to any portion of their father’s estate.254 Because 
Louisiana, after a decades-long and often emotional battle in the 
legislature and courts, has largely adopted the common law 
principle of “free testation,” Louis was entitled to give away his 
entire estate to any person or institution he desired upon his 
death.255 It is indeed ironic, Stephanie might add, that if Louis had 
                                                                                                             
 253. LA. CIV. CODE art. 1493(A) (2011) (providing that forced heirs are 
“descendants of the first degree who, at the time of the death of the decedent, are 
twenty-three years of age or younger or descendants of the first degree of any 
age who, because of mental incapacity or physical infirmity, are permanently 
incapable of taking care of their persons or administering their estates at the time 
of the death of the decedent”).  
 254. LA. CIV. CODE ART. 1497 (2011) (“If there is no forced heir, donations 
inter vivos and mortis causa may be made to the whole amount of the property 
of the donor, saving the reservation made hereafter.”). 
 255. For a detailed history of this struggle, see Kathryn Venturatos Lorio, 
The Changing Face of Forced Heirship: A New Louisiana Creation, in 
LOUISIANA: MICROCOSM OF A MIXED JURISDICTION, 181–211 (Vernon 
Valentine Palmer ed., 1999). For a detailed analysis of the legal and social 
ramifications of Louisiana’s re-conceptualization of forced heirship, see 
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died before both Talia and Joshua had reached the age of 24, they 
would have been legally entitled to share at least one-half of his 
estate,256 unless they had so seriously mistreated Louis, so 
embarrassed him, or ignored him to such a degree that Louis would 
have been justified in disinheriting them.257 In short, Stephanie 
would explain, Talia and Joshua were lucky their father had left 
them as much as he had. And there was nothing a court could do 
about it.258  
After they had absorbed this news, Talia and Joshua asked 
Stephanie whether they could bring a lawsuit to annul their 
father’s will on the ground that Julia had manipulated their father 
and led him to make these dispositions against his better judgment. 
Stephanie paused now, because she knew her advice was about 
to become more ambiguous. And, the last thing she would want to 
do at this point would be to raise false hopes. 
 “Yes,” Stephanie would answer. “We can bring a lawsuit 
claiming that your father’s will should be annulled because Julia 
has exercised ‘undue influence’ over him. But there is no 
guarantee of success.” 
Before Louisiana began the lengthy process of re-
conceptualizing the institution of forced heirship in the 1980s and 
early 1990s (a process that was finally completed in 1995 as the 
result of a state-wide referendum amending the Louisiana 
                                                                                                             
 
Katherine Shaw Spaht, The Remnant of Forced Heirship: The Interrelationship 
of Undue Influence, What’s Become of Disinherison, and the Unfinished 
Business of the Stepparent Usufruct, 60 LA. L. REV. 637 (2000). 
 256. LA. CIV. CODE art. 1495 (2011) (specifying amounts of forced and 
disposable portions). If Louis had been survived by only one forced heir, the 
forced portion would have only been one quarter of his estate. Id. Thus, for 
example, if Louis had died when Talia was 24, but Joshua was only 22, Joshua 
would have been legally entitled to one fourth of Louis’s estate, while Talia 
could claim nothing. 
 257. See, e.g., LA. CIV. CODE arts. 1617–1626 (2011) (providing 
comprehensive legal framework for disinherison of forced heirs). Louisiana 
Civil Code article 1621 enumerates eight specific grounds for a parent to 
disinherit a child who would otherwise be a forced heir. Most of these grounds 
entail some form of cruel treatment (striking a parent, attempting to take the life 
of a parent, using violence or coercion to hinder a parent from making a will). 
One ground concerns egregious embarrassment (being convicted of a crime 
punishable by life imprisonment or death). And another stems from lack of 
attention (an adult child fails to communicate with the parent for a period of two 
years). LA. CIV. CODE art. 1621 (2001). 
 258. See, e.g., In re Succession of Crawford, 923 So. 2d 642, 649 (La. Ct. 
App. 1st 2005) (holding that since son was not a forced heir of his mother’s 
estate, he was not entitled to a forced portion and his mother was free to do as 
she wished with her property by donation mortis causa). 
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Constitution),259 Louisiana law generally did not allow 
disappointed heirs to challenge a will on the ground of undue 
influence. It is true that a disappointed heir could always challenge 
a will on the ground that the testator lacked the necessary 
testamentary capacity at the time of execution.260 And it is also true 
that such a person can still do so today, although on slightly 
different grounds.261 But until 1991, one of the cornerstones of the 
Louisiana Civil Code was article 1492’s general prohibition 
against offering proof that a donation was made “through hatred, 
anger, suggestion or capitation.”262 
This prohibition against offering proof of suggestion and 
capitation was a product of Louisiana’s Roman and French legal 
heritage. As Professor Ron Scalise has recently shown, although 
Roman society was very aware of the possibility that persons 
outside a testator’s family and interested heirs might try to use 
their influence over the testator to capture a legacy (“captatio”), 
Roman law generally did not allow wills to be annulled merely 
because the recipient of a legacy might have exerted his influence 
over the testator.263 Usually something more sinister—such as 
duress, force, or fraud—was required.264 Moreover, Roman law’s 
primary response to the threat of capitation was simply to prohibit 
legacies to those best positioned to unduly influence a testator—
witnesses to a will.265 French law developed a similar approach to 
the specter of suggestion and capitation by not recognizing these as 
independent grounds for annulling a will. France permits 
invalidation of a will only when evidence of suggestion or 
capitation is combined with evidence of more serious interference, 
                                                                                                             
 259. Lorio, supra note 255, at 186–98. 
 260. LA. CIV. CODE art. 1475 (1870); LA. CIV. CODE art. 1472 (1870).  
 261. LA. CIV. CODE art. 1477 (2011) (“To have the capacity to make a 
donation inter vivos or mortis causa, a person must also be able to comprehend 
generally the nature and consequences of the disposition that he is making.”).  
 262. LA. CIV. CODE art. 1492 (1870). Article 1492 of the 1870 Code 
replicated article 1479 of the 1825 Civil Code and an identical provision in the 
Digest of 1808. LA. CIV. CODE art. 1492 (West Compiled ed. 1978). Thus the 
Civil Code’s ban on evidence of suggestion and capitation was unchanged from 
1808 until its repeal in 1989 when the legislature specified that the only persons 
who could claim the status of forced heir were individuals 23 years old and 
younger and those of any age who have been interdicted or are subject to 
interdiction because of mental incapacity or physical infirmity. See Lorio, supra 
note 255, at 196; Katherine Spaht, Kathryn Lorio, Cynthia Picou, Cynthia 
Samuel & Frederick Swaim, The New Forced Heirship Legislation: A 
Regrettable “Revolution,” 50 LA. L. REV. 409, 452–74 (1990). 
 263. Ronald J. Scalise, Jr., Undue Influence and the Law of Wills: A 
Comparative Analysis, 19 DUKE J. COMP. & INT’L L. 41, 43–46 (2008). 
 264. Id. at 43–45. 
 265. Id. at 46–47. 
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such as outright fraud, deception and isolation of the testator.266 In 
addition, France also bans gifts to certain persons whose 
relationship with the donor presents a high risk of potential for 
undue influence—namely doctors, health professionals, and 
pharmacists.267 Because Louisiana courts generally equated 
evidence of what common law lawyers called “undue influence” 
with the civilian notion of “capitation,” they used article 1942 to 
bar undue influence claims for almost 200 years,268 except in a few 
narrow cases, none of which involved persons who would have 
been forced heirs.269  
Soon after its initial move to restrict the category of forced 
heirs to children under the age of 24 and children who are 
permanently incapable of caring for themselves,270 the Louisiana 
legislature self-consciously opened the door to claims of undue 
influence for the very purpose of offering limited means of 
protection to capable, adult children of testators who make 
donations to persons that might not seem like “natural” 
beneficiaries of that testator’s donative intent.271 Thus, under 
current article 1479 of the Civil Code, enacted in 1991, a court 
shall declare a donation inter vivos or mortis causa “null upon 
                                                                                                             
 266. Id. at 60–63 
 267. Id. at 63–65 (commenting on CODE CIV. [C. CIV.] art. 909). 
 268. Laurie Dearman Clark, Louisiana’s New Law on Capacity to Make and 
Receive Donations: “Unduly Influenced” by the Common Law?, 67 TUL. L. 
REV. 183, 221–22 (1992).  
 269. Those narrow exceptions involved cases in which someone alleged 
undue influence at the very moment a donation was being executed or when it 
was offered to show the donor or testator’s lack of mental capacity. See Cormier 
v. Myers, 65 So. 2d 259, 271–72 (La. 1953); Succession of Hamiter, 519 So. 2d 
341, 344 (La. Ct. App. 2d 1988) (admitting proof that caretaker of testator 
exerted influence over testator at time will was executed); see also Spaht et al., 
supra note 262, at 453–54 (observing that “the litigation in Louisiana in which 
allegations were made of fraud and improper influence principally involved 
collateral relations of the decedent for whom contesting the will was an ‘all or 
nothing proposition” and citing cases). See also Succession of Gilbert, 850 So. 
2d 733, 735 (La. Ct. App. 2d 2003) (observing that in light of the high burden 
imposed by former article 1492, Louisiana courts “considered evidence of 
influence only when it affected, or virtually destroyed, the mental capacity of the 
testator”; citing Hamiter, supra). 
 270. Act No. 788, 1989 La. Acts 2210, 2211; Act No. 147, 1990 La. Acts 
474, 476–77. Both acts were declared unconstitutional in Succession of Lauga, 
624 So. 2d 1156 (La. 1993). See Lorio, supra note 255, at 196–99 (discussing 
the detailed provisions of the 1989 and 1990 Acts and the Louisiana Supreme 
Court’s invalidating decision in Lauga). 
 271. See Spaht, supra note 255, at 647–48 (noting linkage between 1980–
1990 restriction of forced heirship and passage of legislation establishing 
possibility of undue influence claims); Spaht et al., supra note 262, at 452–54 
(same). 
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proof that it is the product of influence by the donee or another 
person that so impaired the volition of the donor as to substitute the 
volition of the donee or other person for the volition of the 
donor.”272 This classic substitution theory formulation of the test 
for undue influence is derived directly from Anglo-American 
common law sources and represents a distilled, liberalized 
approach to undue influence in which additional evidence of 
coercion or fraud is not required.273 
In establishing undue influence claims, the Louisiana 
legislature also established the burdens of proof for such claims. 
Generally, a person who challenges a donor’s capacity on the 
grounds of fraud, duress, or undue influence must prove his claim 
by “clear and convincing evidence.”274 However, if at the time the 
donation was made or the testament executed, “a relationship of 
confidence existed between the donor and the wrongdoer and the 
wrongdoer was not then related to the donor by affinity, 
consanguinity or adoption,” the challenger need only prove fraud, 
duress or undue influence by a “preponderance of the evidence.”275 
This means that, if a person who allegedly exerted undue influence 
is someone like a spouse or a natural or adopted child, the claimant 
must meet the rigorous “clear and convincing” burden of proof.276 
But if the alleged wrongdoer is some unrelated person who 
nevertheless had a relationship of confidence with the donor, such 
as a hired caregiver,277 a lawyer,278 an accountant,279 or even an 
unmarried companion or cohabitant,280 the claimant would have to 
                                                                                                             
 272. LA. CIV. CODE art. 1479 (2011), enacted by Act No. 363, 1991 La. Acts 
1284, 1293. 
 273. Scalise, supra note 263, at 50–53; Hall v. Hall, (1868) 1 LRP&D (Ct. 
Prob. & Divorce) (U.K.); THOMAS E. ATKINSON, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF 
WILLS 256 (2d ed. 1953). 
 274. LA. CIV. CODE art. 1483 (2011). 
 275. Id. (emphasis added). 
 276. Id. cmt c. 
 277. Succession of Fisher, 970 So. 2d 1048, 1055–56 (La. Ct. App. 1st 
2007); Succession of Braud, 646 So. 2d 1168, 1172 (La. Ct. App. 4th 1994). 
 278. Successions of Tanner, 836 So. 2d 1280, 1283 (La. Ct. App. 4th 2003), 
rev’d on other grounds, 847 So. 2d 1233 (La. 2003); cf. Succession of 
Spitzfaden II, 30 So. 3d 88, 93 (La. Ct. App. 5th 2009) (holding that clear and 
convincing burden of proof under Article 1483 applied even though an attorney 
prepared the will for the decedent and was thus in a “relationship of 
confidence,” and the attorney was a first cousin, and thus a relative, of the 
decedent). 
 279. Succession of Linder, 824 So. 2d 523, 527–28 (La. Ct. App. 5th 2002). 
 280. Succession of Gilbert, 850 So. 2d 733, 734, 737 (La. Ct. App. 2d 2003). 
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establish undue influence only by the more lenient “preponderance 
of the evidence” standard.281  
As we shall see, however, the mere presence of this relaxed 
burden of proof does not guarantee a finding of undue influence. 
One reason for this is that courts have established several 
additional evidentiary presumptions or rules of thumb of their own. 
For instance, drawing on a statement in the comments to article 
1479,282 many courts have held that undue influence may not be 
established by evidence of “mere advice, or persuasion, or 
kindness or assistance.”283 Some courts routinely insist that before 
they will annul a testament or donation they must be convinced 
that the undue influence was operative at the time the testament or 
act of donation was executed, even though the acts creating the 
influence may have occurred prior to the moment of execution and 
even though the person who exerted the pressure may not have 
been present at the moment of execution.284 In sum, the map of 
legal directives relating to an undue influence claim in Louisiana 
starts with an unmistakable standard imported from the common 
law. That standard, however, is shaded by one code-based 
presumption designed to make certain kinds of undue influence 
claims easier to prove and a number of jurisprudential rules of 
thumb that seem designed to make findings of undue influence 
relatively rare. 
A. Claims Against Stepparents 
So what about the particular situation in which Talia and 
Joshua now find themselves? Can competent, adult children who 
have been largely or completely disinherited bring a successful 
undue influence claim against a stepparent who is the principal 
beneficiary of a decedent’s will? The answer is uncertain. 
In Succession of Reeves,285 an attorney and prominent member 
of a small Louisiana community died with a will that left half of 
                                                                                                             
 281. In some common law states, a relationship of confidence produces not 
just a lower burden of proof but an actual presumption of undue influence, 
particularly if there are other “suspicious circumstances” connected with the 
donation. Scalise, supra note 263, at 56–57. 
 282. LA. CIV. CODE art. 1479 cmt. b (2011). 
 283. Tanner, 836 So. 2d at 1284 (holding that advice, persuasion, and 
assistance do not destroy the agency of the donor or substitute for the donor’s 
volition); Succession of Anderson, 656 So. 2d 42, 45 (La. Ct. App. 2d 1995). 
 284. Succession of Berman, 937 So. 2d 437, 441 (La. Ct. App. 4th 2006); 
Gilbert, 850 So. 2d at 736; Tanner, 836 So. 2d at 1284. This rule is also drawn 
from a statement in the comments to article 1479. See LA. CIV. CODE art. 1479 
cmt. d (2011). 
 285. Succession of Reeves, 704 So. 2d 252 (La. App. 3d 1997). 
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his substantial estate to his second, much younger wife and the 
other half of his estate to nine of his ten children from a previous 
marriage.286 When the completely disinherited child sued to 
invalidate the will on the ground that his stepmother had exerted 
undue influence over the testator,287 the trial court agreed.288 On 
appeal, however, a divided five-judge panel of the Louisiana Third 
Circuit Court of Appeal reversed.289  
Although the majority opinion declined to hold that an undue 
influence claim “can never be leveled against a surviving spouse 
who is the main beneficiary of a testament by her spouse of eleven 
years,” it clearly signaled distaste for such claims and suggested 
that a surviving spouse is “not the intended target of Article 
1479.”290 According to the majority opinion, the proper “target” of 
such a claim would be someone other than the “the natural object 
of the testator’s bounty” (someone other than a spouse or child, 
such as a distant relative or a “paramour”) who uses “devious 
means” to convince the testator to violate his natural 
inclinations.291 The surviving spouse, the majority asserted, should 
generally be immune from accusations of undue influence because 
the legal and emotional foundations of the husband and wife 
relationship require susceptibility to the other’s needs, intimacy, 
and a desire to promote the other’s interests.292 The legal and social 
foundations of a marriage, the court seemed to suggest, render the 
essential elements of an undue influence claim—susceptibility, 
opportunity, disposition, and coveted result293—essentially 
“meaningless” when asserted against a spouse.294  
In the end, the Reeves court held that a claim of undue 
influence against a surviving spouse can succeed only if the 
                                                                                                             
 286. Id. at 253–54. The surviving spouse married the decedent when she was 
38 and he was 60 years old. Id. at 254. 
 287. The other nine children of the testator filed a petition alleging that the 
stepmother’s share of the decedent’s estate exceeded the legally disposable 
portion. They sought a reduction of the excess donation and recognition of their 
forced portion free and clear of any usufruct. Id. at 254, n.1. As the will was 
executed in 1992, their claim to forced heirship status was accurate, but the 
court never reached this issue. 
 288. Id. at 253–54, 257–58.  
 289. Id. at 258. 
 290. Id. at 258.  
 291. Id. at 259–60. 
 292. Id. 
 293. Id. at 259; see also Scalise, supra note 263, at 55.  
 294. Reeves, 704 So. 2d at 259. In Reeves, the appellate court majority 
specifically rejected the trial court’s finding that the surviving spouse exploited 
the decedent’s “sexual dependency and fear of abandonment” because it asserted 
that “love, companionship and intimacy are the primary reasons that people 
marry, ergo the marital imperatives.” Id. 
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challenger shows evidence of physical or emotional abuse, fraud, 
deceit, or criminal conduct—a particularly high burden of proof295 
reminiscent of that used before the twentieth century at common 
law and at times in the civil law.296 Although two judges dissented 
from the majority ruling,297 and although the Louisiana Supreme 
Court granted writs to consider an appeal,298 the case was 
voluntarily dismissed as the result of a settlement without any final 
resolution of the significant legal issues involved.299  
The majority decision in Reeves, it is important to note, has 
also been sharply criticized by Professor Katherine Spaht for 
having erroneously grafted onto the Civil Code additional 
requirements for proving undue influence against a testator’s 
spouse and for undermining the protections that the undue 
influence articles were designed to provide for vulnerable 
descendants.300 In particular, Spaht points out that the legislature’s 
codification of undue influence was motivated by a desire to 
protect former forced heirs from disinherison at the hands of 
strangers as well as stepparents.301 Spaht also claims that the 
legislature’s intention to protect forced heirs from over-reaching by 
stepparents, especially stepmothers, is well supported by social 
science research and common law experience.302 
It is difficult to discern the impact of the majority opinion in 
Reeves on potential undue influence claims against surviving 
spouse stepparents. In the only other reported decision involving a 
similar claim, an appellate court affirmed the dismissal of an undue 
influence claim asserted by three adult children who had been 
completely disinherited by their father in favor of a surviving 
spouse who had been living with the father for twenty years, caring 
for him in his later years, and whom he secretly married less than a 
year before his death.303 Rather than engage the controversial legal 
conclusions of the Reeves majority,304 the appellate court rested its 
                                                                                                             
 295. Id.  
 296. Scalise, supra note 263, at 44–53. 
 297. In dissent, Judges Amy and Yelverton found no legislative basis to 
establish a safe harbor for surviving spouses from undue influence claims. 
Reeves, 704 So. 2d at 262, 264. 
 298. Succession of Reeves, 805 So. 2d 185 (La. 1998). 
 299. Spaht, supra note 255, at 649. 
 300. Id. 
 301. Id. at 653–54. 
 302. Id. at 651–52. 
 303. Succession of Cooper, 830 So. 2d 1087, 1088–89, 1091–93 (La. Ct. 
App. 2d 2002). 
 304. See Spaht, supra note 255, at 648–55 (offering extended critique of 
Reeves), and at 649 (stating that Reeves “erroneously grafts onto the provisions 
of Civil Code articles 1479 and1483 additional requirements for proving undue 
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decision on narrower factual grounds by finding that the limited 
circumstantial evidence offered by the disinherited children failed 
to prove undue influence.305 
Perhaps the majority opinion in Reeves deterred some 
disappointed children from asserting undue influence claims 
against stepparents. Perhaps Professor Spaht’s criticism has caused 
some stepparent defendants to settle undue influence claims rather 
than rely on the majority opinion’s reasoning. All we can know for 
sure is that Talia and Joshua, the disappointed descendants of 
Louis, can no longer rely on the bright line rule of forced heirship 
that would have guaranteed them a much larger portion of their 
deceased father’s estate. Instead, because Louisiana has erected a 
new bright-line rule protecting freedom of testation, except when a 
testator’s children are still relatively young or permanently 
dependent, Talia and Joshua do have a potential remedy through an 
undue influence claim but that remedy is clouded by 
jurisprudential uncertainty. 
B. Claims Against Everyone Else: Unmarried Co-Habitants, Other 
Relatives, Caretakers and Strangers 
Would Talia and Joshua have a better chance of invalidating 
their father’s will if the residuary legatee accused of undue 
influence had not been his second wife, but someone else—such as 
an unmarried companion, a caretaker, a distant relative, or another 
descendant? Let’s take each sub-category in turn. 
The only reported decision involving an unmarried cohabitant 
shows that disinherited children like Talia and Joshua still face an 
uphill battle. In that case, a daughter claimed that her mother’s 
live-in, male companion and caretaker had exerted undue influence 
on her mother. She sought to annul the mother’s will, which left 
the mother’s house and all of her mineral and royalty interests to 
the companion.306 Even though the more lenient preponderance of 
the evidence standard applied due to the relationship of confidence 
between the caretaker and the testator, the court rejected the 
daughter’s claim despite evidence that the companion caretaker 
                                                                                                             
 
influence whenever the alleged ‘wrongdoer’ is the spouse of the testator” and 
suggesting that these “jurisprudential requirements seriously undermine the 
purpose of these articles”).  
 305. Cooper, 830 So. 2d at 1091–92. 
 306. Succession of Gilbert, 850 So. 2d 733, 734–35 (La. Ct. App. 2d 2003).  
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had made negative comments about the daughter and her 
siblings.307  
If the unexpected beneficiary of Louis’ will had been a 
complete outsider, such as a hired caretaker or nurse who had no 
other relationship with the testator or donor, Talia and Joshua 
might have a better prospect of success. In one case, an appellate 
court found that a handyman exerted undue influence over a 101-
year-old retired school teacher. Thus, the court nullified a notarial 
will which had made the handyman the decedent’s universal 
legatee and thus reestablished a local church as the universal 
legatee under the decedent’s previous olographic will.308 In another 
case, an appellate court held that the nieces and nephews of a 
wealthy widow presented sufficient medical and other evidence to 
show that the widow’s hired caregiver had exerted undue influence 
over the testator. As a result, the court nullified the testator’s final 
will, which had made the caregiver the universal legatee of the 
testator’s $2 million estate.309  
But disappointed descendants cannot be completely confident 
that an undue influence claim against an outsider will succeed. For 
example, in one case, an undue influence claim against the 
testator’s caregiver, who was named as the sole beneficiary of the 
testator’s final olographic will, failed.310 In another case, an undue 
influence claim against a decedent’s accountant did not succeed 
even though the accountant received the most valuable asset in the 
decedent’s estate.311 In a third outsider case that proceeded all the 
way to the Louisiana Supreme Court, a claim of undue influence 
against a decedent’s lawyer and executor, who received one-half of 
the decedent’s estate under the challenged will, resulted in a series 
of inconsistent rulings that ultimately left the issue of undue 
influence pending for the trial court to resolve.312  
Perhaps the most common provocation for an undue influence 
claim is the case of a testator who leaves her estate to someone 
within the extended family but has preferred one family member 
                                                                                                             
 307. Id. at 734–37. 
 308. Succession of Pardue, 915 So. 2d 415, 417, 425–26 (La. Ct. App. 2d 
2005). 
 309. Succession of Fisher, 970 So. 2d 1048, 1055–56 (La. Ct. App. 1st 
2007).  
 310. Succession of Braud, 646 So. 2d 1168, 1171–73 (La. App. 4th 1994). In 
this case, it may have been material that neither the petitioner nor the legatees 
under the earlier wills were persons who would have been forced heirs. Id. at 
1168–69. 
 311. Succession of Linder, 824 So. 2d 523, 527–28 (La. Ct. App. 5th 2002).  
 312. Successions of Tanner, 836 So. 2d 1280, 1282–85 (La. Ct. App. 4th 
2003) (affirming summary judgment dismissal of undue influence claim), rev’d, 
847 So. 2d 1233 (La. 2003) (citing genuine issues of material fact). 
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over another. In one noteworthy case, two sons succeeded in 
nullifying their father’s will, which had completely disinherited 
them and made a third son the universal legatee, on the ground that 
this son exerted undue influence by intentionally exacerbating the 
father’s resentment toward the other two sons and had exploited 
the father’s clinical depression, dementia, and propensity toward 
delusion.313 
But for every successful undue influence claim asserted within 
the family circle, there seem to be even more unsuccessful claims. 
Thus, one court rejected an undue influence claim in the context of 
a dispute between a decedent’s widow and the decedent’s first 
cousin (and attorney) in connection with a will that left a 
significant portion of the decedent’s estate to his first cousin’s 
children rather than to the widow and her children from a previous 
marriage.314 Other courts have rejected undue influence claims in 
the context of intra-family feuds between a testator’s son and 
daughter on one hand and the testator’s daughter-in-law on the 
other,315 a testator’s niece and the testator’s niece-by-marriage (a 
love child of the testator’s brother-in-law),316 and the adopted 
daughter of a testator and the testator’s biological daughter.317 Yet 
another court rejected an undue influence claim asserted by two 
brothers against their sister.318 This record suggests that Tolstoy 
may have been right: “All happy families resemble one another, 
each unhappy family is unhappy in its own way.”319 
C. An Undue Influence Final Accounting 
As we have seen, the vast majority of undue influence claims 
(in reported cases at least) have been rejected regardless of whether 
the alleged wrongdoer is a family member,320 an outsider,321 or 
                                                                                                             
 313. Succession of Lounsberry, 824 So. 2d 409, 413–15 (La. Ct. App. 3d 
2002). The court held, in fact, that a testator’s pre-testamentary resentment 
toward plaintiffs does not bar a finding of undue influence. Id. at 413. 
 314. Succession of Spitzfaden, 30 So. 3d 88, 93 (La. Ct. App. 5th 2009).  
 315. Succession of Deshotel, 10 So. 3d 873, 881–82 (La. Ct. App. 3d 2009). 
 316. Succession of Polk, 940 So. 2d 895, 898–99 (La. Ct. App. 3d 2006).  
 317. Succession of Deshotels, 735 So. 2d 826, 828–30, 831–32 (La. Ct. App. 
3d 1999).  
 318. Succession of Berman, 937 So. 2d 437, 441–43 (La. App. 4th 2006). 
The brothers, who had worked with their father in the family business for 
decades were disappointed when the father, with his daughter’s help, changed 
his will to equalize distribution of his estate rather than leave significant New 
Orleans real estate assets housing the family business to the sons alone. 
 319. LEO TOLSTOY, ANNA KARENINA 1 (1877) (Oxford Univ. Press 1998). 
 320. Succession of Spitzfaden II, 30 So. 3d 88, (La. Ct. App. 5th 2009) 
(rejecting claim of widow of decedent against first cousin/attorney of decedent); 
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someone sitting uncomfortably on the borderline between relative 
and non-relative.322 But, perhaps just often enough to preserve the 
hopes of disappointed descendants, or perhaps more accurately to 
encourage their counsel to file lawsuits in the hope of extracting 
favorable settlements, courts have invalidated testaments finding 
that undue influence has been exercised by outsiders323 and even 
by family members.324 On the other hand, it does not appear that 
descendants, who would have been guaranteed forced portions 
under Louisiana’s former forced heirship regime, are privileged 
when they assert that undue influence has been exerted by 
stepparents—a class of persons treated as a kind of suspect class 
elsewhere in the Civil Code.325 
What has emerged then is a classic example of a hybrid regime 
of legal directives.326 Initially, Louisiana, like other civil law 
systems, chose to protect the interests of those often considered to 
be the “natural” objects of donative or testamentary intent 
(principally children and spouses) through the forced heirship 
regime,327 community property law,328 and the marital portion.329 
                                                                                                             
 
Deshotel, 10 So. 3d at 881–82 (rejecting claim of son and daughter of decedent 
against daughter-in-law of decedent and her husband); Berman, 937 So. 2d 437 
(rejecting claim of two brothers against their sister); Deshotels, 735 So. 2d at 
828–30, 831–32 (rejecting claim of adopted daughter against biological 
daughter). 
 321. Succession of Gilbert, 850 So. 2d 733 (La. Ct. App. 2d 2003) (rejecting 
daughter’s claim against mother’s caretaker and live-in companion); Succession 
of Linder, 824 So. 2d 523 (La. Ct. App. 5th 2002) (daughter, forced heir, loses 
against accountant who received most valuable asset). 
 322. Succession of Polk, 940 So. 2d 895, 897–99 (La. Ct. App. 3d 2006). 
(rejecting undue influence at the hand of a “niece by marriage”). 
 323. Succession of Fisher, 970 So. 2d 1048, 1055–56 (La. Ct. App. 1st 2007) 
(caretaker); Succession of Pardue, 915 So. 2d 415, 417, 425–26 (La. Ct. App. 2d 
2005) (handyman). 
 324. Succession of Lounsberry, 824 So. 2d 409 (La. App. 3d 2002) (one son 
exerted undue influence at expense of two plaintiff sons). 
 325. See LA. CIV. CODE art. 573(2) (2011) (exempting stepparents from Civil 
Code’s general dispensation of legal usufructuaries’ obligation to provide 
security upon the commencement of a usufruct); LA. CIV. CODE arts. 1499 and 
1514 (2011) (establishing similar but narrower rules relating to obligation to 
provide security for stepparents when naked owners are forced heirs in the 
context of testamentary usufructs). 
 326. Sullivan, supra note 1, at 61–62. 
 327. Scalise, supra note 363, at 82–86; Lorio, supra note 255, at 181–195; 
Spaht, supra note 255, at 640–42. 
 328. See supra notes 91–93 and accompanying text. See also Scalise, supra 
note 263, at 86–92 (suggesting how community property serves as another 
family protection device). 
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All of these institutions depended heavily on classic rules. But 
because Louisiana has now severely restricted forced heirship to 
protect the power of individuals to freely dispose of their 
property,330 we have left individual courts with the difficult task of 
identifying instances in which some individual has interfered with 
a testator or donor’s free will to such an extent that it is necessary 
to annul a testament or donation (and perhaps restore the “natural” 
or “normal” order of donative intent) on the muddy grounds of 
undue influence.331  
At the same time, however, the stringent, “clear and convincing 
evidence” burden of proof established in article 1483 makes it 
difficult for actual undue influence claimants to prevail in many 
cases. Furthermore, the legislature has also established a looser 
burden of proof (the “preponderance of the evidence” standard for 
non-relative confidants) which encourages some disinherited 
descendants to try to fit their claims into a narrower category of 
cases where they may have at least a facially greater chance of 
establishing undue influence and invalidating an unfavorable 
testament or donation.332 And finally, at least one court has 
established a controversial rule that seeks to prohibit almost all 
                                                                                                             
 
 329. LA. CIV. CODE art. 2432 (2011). See also LA. CIV. CODE. art. 2434 
(2011) (establishing the quantum of the marital portion with rule-like precision). 
But also note that the determination of whether a spouse dies rich in comparison 
with a surviving spouse under article 2432 is not subject to any bright line test. 
See Succession of Firmin, 38 So. 3d 445, 447–48 (La. Ct. App. 4th 2010) 
(finding surviving spouse did not prove her husband died rich in comparison to 
her). 
 330. Scalise, supra note 263, at 58–59.  
 331. For more on the inter-relationship between undue influence and the 
policy interest in protecting children from disinheritance, see Ronald Chester, 
Should American Children be Protected Against Disinheritance?, 32 REAL 
PROP. PROB. & TR. J. 405 (1997); Ray D. Madoff, Unmasking Undue Influence, 
81 MINN. L. REV. 571 (1997); Melanie B. Leslie, The Myth of Testamentary 
Freedom, 38 ARIZ. L. REV. 235 (1996). Several of these non-Louisiana authors 
lament Louisiana’s evolution from a forced heirship regime to one based on 
“free testation” and relying primarily on undue influence to protect adult 
children from unwarranted disinheritance. See Chester, supra, at 438–441 
(describing Louisiana’s evolution as moving from a model based on family 
protection to one based on individualism); Madoff, supra, at 618–619 
(suggesting ironically that, within Louisiana’s former forced heirship regime, 
there was actually greater freedom of testation within the disposable portion 
than in the other 49 common law states because of the Civil Code’s prior ban on 
evidence of undue influence). 
 332. LA. CIV. CODE art. 1483 (2011); supra notes 274–84, 306–18 and 
accompanying text. 
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undue influence claims against stepparents.333 In short, we seem to 
have moved from a landscape governed predominantly by 
crystalline rules to one in which two principles—free testation and 
the principle that a donation or testament can be annulled if the 
donor’s volition is impaired by undue influence—are destined to 
be linked together in uneasy conflict that must be mediated on a 
case-by-case basis by judges exercising substantial discretion. 
CONCLUSION 
Having reached the end of our journey with Esther and Louis 
and their descendants and legatees, we can see now that it is 
impossible to generalize as to whether the most crucial decisions 
and actions in their private lives will be governed by classic rules 
or classic standards. Originally, I suspected that Louisiana had 
moved decisively in the direction of discretionary remedialism, 
just as Nial Whitty found to have occurred in Scotland a decade 
ago.334 But upon further study, I discovered that, if such a 
movement had occurred in Louisiana, it has at least been partially 
checked by the resiliency of several traditional rule-based systems 
(the hard-edged regimes of community property and co-
ownership), by the development of relatively fine-tuned 
jurisprudential rules (with respect to spousal support and claims for 
contribution for education and training), and by the overlay of 
many detailed, ruled-based regimes that originate outside of the 
Civil Code in the Revised Statutes (e.g., with respect to child 
custody and child support). In one important area (transfer of 
wealth upon death), however, Louisiana has minimized the 
importance of a classic rule-based regime (forced heirship) and 
replaced it with a cause of action for undue influence that is 
regulated by looser standards that grant judges much more 
individual discretion. 
It is important to recognize that this Article’s purpose has not 
been to determine whether Louisiana’s lawmakers have chosen the 
ideal mixture of rules and standards in each particular area of the 
law encountered. Answering that question for each area would 
require complex normative assessments that are beyond this 
Article’s scope. But, if my efforts here lead others to explore the 
tradeoff between rules and standards in Louisiana law, those 
inquiries should be sensitive to several additional concerns.  
                                                                                                             
 333. Succession of Reeves, 704 So. 2d 252 (La. Ct. App. 3d 1997), discussed 
supra in text accompanying notes 285–305. 
 334. See generally Whitty, supra note 7. 
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First, we should remember that we are living in a period in 
which concerns about the danger of judicial bias are real. One 
Louisiana scholar, Vernon Palmer, has recently presented a 
compelling, though controversial, empirical study that suggests a 
serious risk of actual bias in the voting patterns of Louisiana 
Supreme Court justices resulting from judicial campaign donations 
made by litigants and lawyers and the justices’ current practice of 
non-recusal.335 Even if not everyone agrees with Palmer’s findings 
as they relate to the current Louisiana Supreme Court,336 many 
Louisiana lawyers would probably agree that the combination of 
an elected judiciary, judicial campaign committees’ frequent 
solicitation of donations from the local bar, and infrequent or non-
existent judicial recusal creates at least the perception of actual 
bias at the trial court and intermediate appellate court level. Until 
Louisiana addresses this perception of bias by stiffening recusal 
requirements, prohibiting judicial campaign donations by lawyers 
or litigants, or moving towards public funding of judicial 
campaigns or simply to an appointed judiciary,337 the choices we 
make between discretion cabining rules and discretionary 
standards will have a significant impact on the moral authority of 
judges and the legitimacy of our entire legal system. 
Second, as both Whitty and Atiyah have emphasized, we must 
continue to be sensitive to how certain discretion-based legal 
regimes can create unequal playing fields in which the wealthiest, 
best educated, and best represented parties acquire an advantage 
over less advantaged opponents.338 In other words, although 
standards can provide an opportunity for judges to produce 
outcomes that are consistent with our noblest ideals concerning 
distributive justice, we need to remember that the formal equality 
promised by rule-based regimes can be egalitarian as well if they 
                                                                                                             
 335. See generally Palmer, supra note 64; see also Vernon Valentine Palmer 
& John Levendis, The Louisiana Supreme Court in Question: An Empirical and 
Statistical Study of the Effects of Campaign Money on the Judicial Function, 82 
TUL. L. REV. 1291 (2008). 
 336. See, e.g., Kevin R. Tully & E. Phelps Gay, The Louisiana Supreme 
Court Defended: A Rebuttal of The Louisiana Supreme Court in Question: An 
Empirical and Statistical Study of the Effects of Campaign Money on the 
Judicial Function, 69 LA. L. REV. 281 (2009) (pointing out 44 errors out of a 
total data base of 1100 entries relied on by Palmer & Levendis, supra note 335); 
Robert Newman, Janet Speyrer & Dek Terrell, A Methodological Critique of the 
Louisiana Supreme Court in Question: An Empirical and Statistical Study of the 
Effects of Campaign Money on the Judicial Function, 69 LA. L. REV. 307 
(2009). 
 337. Palmer, supra note 64, at 3 (discussing reform efforts under way in 
other states). 
 338. Whitty, supra note 7, at 303; Atiyah, supra note 1, at 1271. 
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reduce the advantages acquired by better endowed litigants. 
Perhaps some of the counter-cyclical movement away from pure, 
open-ended discretion in the areas of family law addressed in Book 
One reflects an implicit understanding of this tradeoff.  
Next, the teaching of the behavioral sciences as to how 
emotion, personal prejudice, intuition, and cognitive deficits can 
affect decision making should be taken into account as we address 
the rule versus standard balance.339 Perhaps by design, or perhaps 
by accident, we have created legal regimes in some of the areas 
examined here that attempt to limit some of the most subjective 
aspects of judicial decision making, while at the same time 
allowing judges to do some contextual balancing and thus avoid 
the tendency of purely rule-based regimes—with their inherently 
over-inclusive or under-inclusive norms—to produce outcomes 
that appear substantively unfair. Deeper consideration of social 
science research may further our appreciation of whether we have 
struck the right balance between rules and standards in Louisiana. 
Finally, as P.S. Atiyah reminded us a generation ago,340 we 
should not forget that laws serve not only a dispute resolution 
function but also a hortatory function—that is, they produce 
incentives that guide and channel behavior in powerful ways. Our 
current mix of rules and standards in the Civil Code still guides 
behavior and endorses a number of powerful social norms.  
Marriage under our current Civil Code is a legal relationship 
governed by the norms of spousal equality and contractual freedom 
and thus has become a relationship that is easy to forge and almost 
as easy to sever. The consequences of severing that relationship are 
guided by a multiplicity of related norms suggesting an underlying 
faith in equality of marital obligation, individual autonomy after 
marriage, and immunity from responsibility for a marriage’s 
demise.  We believe that each spouse is entitled to share in marital 
property accumulation equally, without consideration of marital 
fault. We assume that both spouses have an earning potential 
determined by their own skill and effort. We view ex-spouses’ 
post-divorce, on-going duties to each other as being quite limited. 
                                                                                                             
 339. Many legal academics have begun applying these insights to a wide 
variety of areas of law and governance. See generally Ronnie Cohen & Shannon 
O’Bryne, Burning Down the House: Law, Emotion and the Subprime Mortgage 
Crisis, 45 REAL PROP. TR. & EST. L. J. 677 (2011); Susan A. Bandes, Foreword: 
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And finally, we adhere to the principle that child custody and child 
support obligations should be divided as equally and non-
judgmentally as the ex-spouse’s incomes and earning potential 
allow.  
Co-ownership is governed by an even simpler set of norms. 
Co-owners should have equal rights of access to co-owned 
property. They should have, not merely a voice in decision 
making, but also the right to veto most important decisions about 
the use and development of co-owned property. And they are 
entitled to an unalterable right of exit.  
The new law of forced heirship and undue influence illustrates 
the most dramatic transformation of norms in the areas of law 
examined. Parents no longer owe a legal duty to share family 
wealth with competent, adult children. Dispositions of family 
wealth to outsiders and to distant relatives that result in the 
complete disinheritance of children or close relatives, however, are 
still considered to be suspicious enough that we give judges some 
discretion to declare such dispositions invalid because of undue 
influence.  
In the end, only additional scholarship will enable us to 
determine whether the current distribution of rules, standards, and 
hybrid discretion found in the Louisiana Civil Code succeeds in 
stimulating the kind of behavior that lawmakers may have 
associated with these norms. For now, private individuals like 
Esther and Louis have to muddle through the uneasy mix of rules, 
standards, and hybrid discretion that we have established in and 
around our Civil Code. 
 
